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INTRODUCTION

The administration of President Barack Obama faced an unprecedented
outcry from foreign governments and foreign publics following Edward
Snowden's unauthorized disclosures of classified U.S. electronic
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surveillance activities. The Snowden unauthorized disclosures informed
largely unwitting publics of U.S. surveillance. The disclosures revealed the
extent that the United States conducted signals intelligence (SIGINT)
collection against non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes and that U.S. intelligence
spied on world leaders. The outcry by foreign publics created domestic
pressure on foreign governments to try to push back against the United
States and either penalize or extract concessions from the United States.
Ultimately, President Obama took the unprecedented step of declaring that
"regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside. .. all persons
have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal
information" in Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28).1 PPD-28
precluded U.S. intelligence agencies from using bulk SIGINT for political
intelligence, directed U.S. intelligence agencies to limit dissemination of
non-U.S. persons' personal information to the same degree as allowed for
U.S. persons, and directed U.S. intelligence agencies to limit retention of
non-U.S. persons' personal information to five years unless comparable
U.S. person information could be stored for longer or the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) makes a national security determination that
the data should be kept for a longer period.
PPD-28 was the U.S. government's first recognition and extension of
privacy rights to foreigners. U.S. privacy protections under the Fourth
Amendment have been focused exclusively on U.S. persons. These rights
were understood to emanate from the social contract between democratic
governments and their populations. Thus, PPD-28's extension of privacy
rights to non-U.S. persons raises the question of the legal basis for privacy
rights that extend outside of a state's own citizenry. While the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) include expansive language on a right to
privacy, the UDHR does not impose legal obligations on countries and the
United States has consistently interpreted the ICCPR to not apply
extraterritorially. Further, although the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) also describes a right to privacy and imposes legal
obligations on state parties, the United States is not a party to the ECHR.
International law is largely silent on spying and likely either fails to regulate
espionage or permits espionage. Also, other western nations have not
provided privacy protections for foreigners and have actually passed robust,
less privacy protective, statutes since PPD-28 was issued as the threat
environment has become more complex and dangerous.
PPD-28's voluntary constraints on U.S. SIGINT enacted to mollify
allied and partner government concerns have real security costs that must
1. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Presidential Policy Directive-Signals
Intelligence Activities (PPD-28) (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities [hereinafter PPD-28].
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be taken into account. The restriction on using bulk SIGINT to collect
political intelligence diminishes the Intelligence Community's ability to
pursue one of its principal missions of providing policymakers with
information regarding the plans and intentions of foreign governments to
aid policymakers in crafting U.S. foreign policy decisions. The new
retention limits inhibit the Intelligence Community's ability to investigate
bad actors, detect important relationships, and map out new illicit groups.
This diminishes the Intelligence Community's ability to prevent attacks and
understand new threats. Also, the new dissemination rules add
administrative, processing, and oversight burdens that distract from more
important intelligence work. This dramatic change in the way the United
States conducts SIGINT risks changing the culture of the Intelligence
Community, which could result in diminished imagination and decreased
aggressiveness in intelligence collection at a time when the United States
faces an exceptionally complex threat environment.
These new SIGINT restrictions are now connected with important U.S.
economic interests, and this equity must also be taken into account when
analyzing PPD-28's extension of privacy rights to non-U.S. persons.
Following Snowden's disclosures, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
struck down the European Commission's decision that the U.S. "Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles" provided adequate privacy protections for
Europeans. This meant that U.S. companies could no longer rely on the Safe
Harbor agreement between the European Union and United States, which
was a major data sharing agreement that enabled companies to transfer data
freely between the European Union and the United States, to enable them
to continue to conduct business in Europe. PPD-28 played an important role
in negotiating the new data sharing agreement, Privacy Shield, which
replaced Safe Harbor. The E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield facilitates
2
approximately $260 billion of trade.
The United States must thoroughly analyze the security costs imposed
by PPD-28's SIGINT restrictions and determine whether these risks are
worth the possible foreign policy benefits and economic gains of Privacy
Shield. The United States could choose to become a global leader in
championing the expansion of universal privacy rights; maintain the status
quo of keeping PPD-28 in place unchanged; revise PPD-28 to make the
expansion of privacy protections to another country's citizens contingent
upon that country extending reciprocal privacy protections to U.S. persons;
or rescind provisions in PPD-28 that expand privacy protections to nonU.S. persons abroad because the security risks may be unacceptable.
Ultimately, this Article argues that the United States should rescind PPD28's expansion of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons because of its
2.

PENNY PRITZKER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CABINET EXIT MEMO (2017), https:l

www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2017/01/cabinet-exit-memo-secretary-penny-pritzker.
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cost to U.S. intelligence capabilities, which are critical to protecting U.S.
national security interests, the American people, and the U.S. Homeland.
Rescinding PPD-28 will not result in the same foreign policy difficulties
that existed immediately following Snowden's unauthorized disclosures
because of recent revelations that allied countries in Europe are engaged in
the same type of espionage activities as the United States. Also, Privacy
Shield or a similar future data sharing agreement between the European
Union and United States can survive even without harmful voluntary
limitations on U.S. intelligence activities.
Part I assesses the U.S. legal framework for conducting surveillance and
its focus on protecting U.S. persons' privacy rights. The Constitution was
drafted as a social compact between the American people and the U.S.
government. The drafters of the Declaration of Independence and
Constitution understood government to draw its authority from the consent
of the governed, which consists of the country's own political community,
in exchange for the protection of those people's rights. As Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has evolved to become more privacy protective,<
the focus of the U.S. government and Intelligence Community has always,
been on protecting U.S. persons' privacy rights. U.S. privacy protections
have traditionally not been concerned with the privacy interests of non-U.S.
persons outside of the United States as these individuals were not parties to
the social contract that undergirds our democracy.
Part II explores the international backlash caused by Snowden's revelations regarding the National Security Agency's (NSA's) ability to
collect intelligence on foreigners and monitoring of the communications of
foreign officials. The United States feared the diplomatic rift and continuing,
public pressure in partner countries, especially Germany, would limit those
countries' ability or willingness to share intelligence with the United States,
which would have constituted a blow to U.S. intelligence. Also, foreign
consumers became wary of U.S. technology products and services, and U.S.
companies saw immediate drops in revenue and worried about their longterm economic viability in foreign markets based on the fallout from the
disclosures. The United States responded to the international backlash by
instituting self-imposed surveillance restrictions. The United States pledged
to refrain from conducting electronic surveillance against political figures
in allied countries and gave an unprecedented grant of privacy protections
to non-U.S. persons.
Part III then analyzes the extension of privacy protections to non-U.S.
persons in PPD-28. PPD-28 declared that "our signals intelligence activities
must take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity and
respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and
that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their
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personal information." 3 This part thoroughly examines PPD-28 and its
effect on U.S. SIGINT, especially the significant restriction on the
Intelligence Community's ability to use bulk SIGINT to collect political
intelligence and critical limitations on the dissemination and retention of
non-U.S. persons' personal information. Part III concludes by discussing
the implementation of PPD-28, specifically by the agencies most affected
by the Directive's SIGINT reforms-which are the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and most of all
the NSA.
Subsequently, Part IV addresses the important question of whether there
is a legal underpinning for PPD-28's expansion of privacy protections to
non-U.S. persons. The UDHR does not create any legal rights or impose
any legal obligations on the United States. The United States has
consistently interpreted the ICCPR to not apply extraterritorially so the
Covenant does not extend any privacy rights or impose any obligations
upon the United States in relation to non-U.S. persons outside of the United
States. Although the ECHR treaty does impose legal obligations upon
countries even in relation to espionage that targets foreigners abroad, the
United States is not a party to the ECHR so it does not grant privacy
protections to any individuals in relation to activities conducted by the U.S.
government. Further, international law does not restrict espionage. Instead,
international law is best interpreted to either allow espionage to occur under
the Lotus principle because international law does not prohibit spying or to
actually affirmatively permit espionage. This examination of the
fundamental grants of human rights indicates that there is no basis in
international human rights principles or international law for universal
privacy rights that constrain legitimate U.S. foreign intelligence efforts
targeting non-U.S. persons outside of the United States.
While the United States traditionally did not provide privacy protections
to non-U.S. persons outside of the United States before PPD-28, Part V
examines whether other Western nations have provided privacy protections
to foreigners and whether Western nations have followed in U.S. footsteps
to extend privacy protections to foreigners since the United States issued
PPD-28. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are used as examples
because they are strong allies of the United States that share the U.S.
democratic values and also have highly capable intelligence services.
Ultimately, no Western nation-or indeed any nation with sophisticated
intelligence capabilities besides the United States for that matter-enforces
robust privacy protections for foreigners before or after PPD-28. France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom have actually passed robust, less
privacy protective, statutes since PPD-28 was issued as the threat
environment has become more complex and dangerous in recent years.
3.

PPD-28, supra note 1.
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Certainly, there is a deep commitment to privacy and a more
comprehensive embrace of privacy as a fundamental right in Europe, and
especially in Germany, than in the United States. However, Part V finds
that the commitment to privacy as a fundamental right and the concerns
expressed in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures seem to be largely
rhetorical as they are not actually reflected in law or procedures. A great
deal of the backlash from European nations against the United States likely
stemmed from domestic political pressures because the publics in these
nations often favor more privacy protections than their governments, as the
governments understand the importance of intelligence in defending against
a complicated threat environment and their dependence on U.S. intelligence
to detect and disrupt threats. Further, a great deal of the backlash may stem
from a desire to protect domestic companies from competing U.S.
technology firms.
Part VI focuses on the national security costs from PPD-28's expansion
of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons. The preclusion from using bulk
SIGINT to collect political intelligence diminishes the Intelligence
Community's ability to pursue one of its principal missions of providing
policymakers with information regarding the plans and intentions of foreign
governments to aid policymakers in crafting U.S. foreign policy decisions.
The restrictions on retention limit the Intelligence Community's
investigative flexibility, and may be especially harmful to U.S.
counterterrorism efforts. PPD-28's dissemination restrictions also create
administrative, processing, and oversight burdens that slow down the
intelligence process and distract from more important intelligence work that
is actually critical to national security. Also, PPD-28 signals an
extraordinary shift in culture. The United States had never previously
recognized that foreigners abroad had privacy rights that should be
protected under U.S. law or policy. Foreigners abroad are not part of U.S.
social compact and were therefore not granted the same privacy protections
as U.S. persons. However, PPD-28's grant of privacy protections to nonU.S. persons alters this approach and risks creating a culture of diminished
aggressiveness in the Intelligence Community, which could lead to longterm security vulnerabilities at a time when the United States faces an
exceptionally complex threat environment. The analysis that PPD-28 was
purely a foreign policy decision and not based on constraints imposed by
international human rights principles or international law for universal
privacy rights means that PPD-28 can be rescinded if the risks imposed by
the Directive are judged unacceptable when compared with the foreign
policy gains and economic interests at stake.
Next, Part VII looks at the economic importance of PPD-28's expansion
of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons. The European Union and
United States formerly had the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Framework to satisfy
the E.U. data protection requirements and to facilitate data transfers
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between the European Union and United States. This was extremely
important for U.S. technology companies that also operate in Europe
because they need to be able to pass data freely between Europe and the
United States. Following the Snowden disclosures, the ECJ invalidated the
European Commission's decision that concluded the U.S. "Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles" provided adequate data privacy protections to
Europeans in Schrems in 2015. 4 The ECJ's ruling meant that the Safe
Harbor agreement could no longer be relied upon by companies as a way
of ensuring they were in compliance with E.U. data protection
requirements. PPD-28 played a significant role in securing the successful
negotiation of the new Privacy Shield Framework, which replaced the Safe
Harbor agreement and went into effect in 2016. In addition to the economic
significance of Privacy Shield, and the role PPD-28 played in facilitating
its negotiation, PPD-28 has also played a role in restoring trust in U.S.
technology products and services. Privacy Shield and regaining trust in U.S.
technology products and services are important to U.S. economic interests
and may warrant keeping PPD-28 in place because economic strength
enables the United States to exert geopolitical influence.
Part VIII explores the U.S. options on how to proceed going forward.
The United States must consider the security costs that are imposed by
PPD-28's voluntary constraints on the U.S. Intelligence Community and
the economic interests that could be harmed by rescinding PPD-28 in
determining how to proceed. The United States could choose to become a
global leader in championing the expansion of universal privacy rights,
maintain the status quo by keeping PPD-28 in its current form, revise PPD28 to make the expansion of privacy protections to another country's
citizens contingent upon that country extending reciprocal privacy
protections to U.S. persons, or rescind provisions in PPD-28 that expand
privacy protections to non-U.S. persons abroad.
Finally, Part IX argues that the United States should rescind PPD-28's
unprecedented expansion of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons. The
United States cannot afford to unilaterally disarm its intelligence
capabilities, which are critical to protecting U.S. national security interests,
the American people, and the U.S. Homeland. PPD-28's restriction on the
Intelligence Community's ability to use bulk SIGINT to collect political
intelligence, limitations on retention periods and the dissemination of nonU.S. person information, and the Directive's cultural signal for the
Intelligence Community pose tremendous security costs. The foreign policy
considerations that initially spurred PPD-28 have been significantly
diminished. Also, the economic impact of rescinding PPD-28's grant of
privacy protections to non-U.S. persons may not be substantial. It is quite
feasible that the United States could rescind PPD-28 and still maintain
4.

Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, 2015 E.C.R. 1-650,
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Privacy Shield, or reach a future data sharing agreement with the European
Union that allows U.S. technology companies to continue to thrive. Further,
foreign consumers' skepticism about using American technology products
and online services may have diminished since the Snowden disclosures.
Thus, this Article concludes that PPD-28's expansion of privacy protections
to non-U.S. persons poses unacceptable security costs that outweigh its
potential economic or foreign policy benefits.
I. THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SURVEILLANCE AND THE
Focus ON PROTECTING U.S. PERSONS' PRIVACY RIGHTS
A. The Constitution'sSocial ContractTheory Origins
The U.S. Constitution was drafted as a social contract between the
American people and the U.S. government. The social compact stressed that
a government's legitimacy stems from the consent of the governed.Formerly free individuals willingly united to establish communities by,1,
undertaking obligations to the government in exchange for the protection
of certain rights.
Social contract theory pervaded American political philosophy prior to
the Constitution. The Pilgrims who journeyed to the New World on the
Mayflower agreed to the Mayflower Compact in 1620, in which they.,
declared, "[w]e . . . solemnly and mutually . . . covenant and combine
ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and
Preservation." 5 Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, influential political'
philosophers at the time of America's founding, championed the idea of a
social contract between individuals and a state. In Leviathan, Hobbes
asserted that individuals agreed to abandon their natural rights and subject
themselves to the sovereign to impose laws and maintain peace. 6 Locke
later argued that formerly free people parted with unrestricted freedom to
form commonwealths to enable governments to protect the rights that
individuals cherished.'
These ideas inspired the drafters of the Constitution and undergird the
nation's founding documents. Shortly before the first shots of the American
Revolution were fired, Alexander Hamilton wrote "the origin of all civil
government, justly established, must be a voluntary compact, between the
rulers and the ruled; and must be liable to such limitations, as are necessary
for the security of the absolute rights of the latter." 8 The Declaration of
5.

Mayflower Compact 1620, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 55,

Perry ed.,
6.
7.
8.

60

(Richard L.

1959).
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 103-06 (1651).
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 32-41 (1689).
Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, in I THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
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Independence expressed the social contract by stating:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.-That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed. 9
Thus, the Declaration of Independence specifically embraced the idea
that individuals form and empower governments based on the compact that
the government will in turn protect its citizens' rights.
The Fourth Amendment asserted:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'"
The Fourth Amendment uses "the people" as a term of art to refer to
those who are a part of the national community." The "purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against
arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never ... intended to
restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the
12
[U.S.] territory."'
Shortly after ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
described the Constitution as a contract between the American people and
U.S. government. In Chisolm v. Georgia in 1793, Chief Justice John Jay
stated that "[e]very State Constitution is a compact.., and the Constitution
of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of the United
States to govern themselves.' 13 Further, Chief Justice John Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819 declared that "[tlhe government of the
Union ... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people ... it
emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised
directly on them, and for their benefit."' 14 The drafters of the Declaration of
Independence and Constitution understood government to draw its power
from the consent of the governed, which consists of the country's own
81, 88 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1961).

9.
10.
I.
12.
13.
14.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

Id.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990).
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404-05 (1819).
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political community, in exchange for the protection of those people's rights.
B. The Early Evolution of FourthAmendment Jurisprudence
The conception of the Fourth Amendment in the nineteenth century
focused on the physical intrusion of searches. Congress passed the Radio
Act of 1927, which provided that "no person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any messages and divulge or publish the contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted messages to any
person."1 5 Section 31 clarified that the Act included all means of
communication employing "electrical energy ... without the aid of any
wire connecting the points" involved in the communication. 16 Thus,
wiretaps remained unregulated after the Radio Act of 1927. The following
year, in Olmstead, the Supreme Court determined that wiretapping did not
constitute a "search" under the Fourth Amendment because there was not a
search or seizure of tangible material or actual physical intrusion into one's
personal property.' 7 The government was free to conduct wiretaps without
any Fourth Amendment or legislative restrictions during this period.
Congress updated the Radio Act by passing the Federal
Communications Act of 1934. The Federal Communications Act set forth
that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, purport,
person."' 18
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communications to any
This extended the Radio Act's prohibition on unauthorized interception of
radio signals to include a ban on the unauthorized interception of wire
communications, which included telephone calls and telegraph messages,
at least when the interception would be divulged. The Federal
Communications Act did not specifically state that the act applied to the
government, though, and the Roosevelt Administration continued to use
wiretaps under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, then-Director of the FBI,
to collect intelligence--especially regarding threats from possible fascist
and communist agents present in the United States. 19 In 1937, the Supreme
Court determined that the Federal Communications Act did apply to the
government, just as it did with private individuals, and that using wiretap
on divulging
recording at trial as evidence violated the statute's prohibition
20
Nardone.
in
communication
intercepted
the
publishing
or
While Nardone may have appeared to prohibit the government from
15. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 27, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
16. Id. § 31.
17. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
18. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat 1064, 1103
(1934).
19. S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 25 (1976); ATHAN THEOHARIS, FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR
HOOVER 180-81 (1991).

20.

Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382-84 (1937).
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engaging in warrantless wiretaps, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
interpreted the decision and Federal Communications Act to allow the
government to conduct wiretaps as long as the information obtained in the
wiretaps was not divulged at trial.21 This interpretation allowed the United
States to continue intelligence collection unimpeded by statutory
constraints as long as information derived from the wiretaps was not used
in a trial, which rarely occurs with foreign intelligence collection. In 1940,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized the Justice Department, through
the FBI, to use wiretaps and other listening devices to collect intelligence
in "grave matters involving the defense of the nation." 22 President
Roosevelt emphasized that the surveillance should be focused on non23
citizens to the extent possible.
In 1967, the Supreme Court drastically broke with prior Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and overturned Olmstead in Katz. 24 The
government attached an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of a public telephone booth the defendant used to place calls in Katz,
and argued such activities did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment because the technique did not involve the physical penetration
of the telephone booth. 2 5 However, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places," and Justice Harlan put forth a
test based on whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
concurrence, which was later adopted by the Court in Smith v. Maryland.2 6
The Court noted in a footnote in Katz that the decision did not determine
whether the same analysis would extend to situations involving national
security, which would include intelligence surveillance.2 7 This left open the
question of whether there may be a Fourth Amendment exception for
national security-and the question remains unanswered because Congress
has stepped in to regulate this area.

21.

WALTER F. MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL: A CASE STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

134 (1965); JOSEPH E. PERSICO, ROOSEVELT'S SECRET WAR: FDR AND WORLD WAR I1ESPIONAGE 35
(2001).

22.

Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Attorney General Robert Jackson

(May 21, 1940), as reprintedin Christine M. Marwick, WarrantlessNational Security Wiretaps, I
FIRST PRINCIPLES: NAT'L SECURITY & C.L., Oct. 1975, at 3, 6-7, http://www.cnss.org/
data/files/resources/FirstPrinciples/FirstPrinciplesVoI INo2.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).

25.

Id. at 348-53.

26. Id. at 351, 361; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-45 (1979).
27. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23; Eric Manpearl & Raheem Chaudhry, Judicial Oversight
ofthe Intelligence Community, in INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY INAMERICAN SOCIETY 71,

71-72 (2016).
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C. Modern FourthAmendment and Statutory ProtectionsFocused on
U.S. Persons
Congress authorized electronic surveillance for criminal investigations
in Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968. In order to
obtain a court order to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications
under Title III, the government must establish:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit [an enumerated crime]; (b)
there is probable cause that particular communications concerning
that offense will be obtained through such interception; (c) normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous; [and] (d) ... there is probable cause for belief that the

facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic
communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to
be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are
28
leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.
Title III superseded the Federal Communications Act and empowered
the government to conduct wiretaps and use the fruits of the wiretaps in
court, albeit with certain restrictions such as the requirement to eventually
notify the target of the Title III application. 29 The legislation did include a
caveat that
[n]othing contained in this chapter... shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary
to protect the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile
acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information
deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect
30
national security information against foreign intelligence activities.
Title III was later amended to include surveillance31 of online
communications, such as email, in addition to telephone calls.
The government's authority to conduct surveillance without prior
judicial approval in security matters was partially considered in 1972 in
Keith.32 Pun Plamondon allegedly conspired to blow-up a CIA recruiting
28.
29.
30.
Stat. 197

31.

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2012).
Id. § 2518(8).
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2511(3), 82
(1970).

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848

(codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C. (2012)).
32. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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facility in Michigan and the Attorney General authorized wiretaps to gather
"intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing
structure of the Government., 33 The Supreme Court determined that
domestic surveillance required appropriate prior warrant procedure, and
therefore the surveillance evidence obtained against Plamondon without
prior judicial approval was unlawftl and had to be disclosed to the defense
because the case only involved domestic intelligence-Plamondon was not
a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. 3 4 The Court continued to leave
open the question of whether the Fourth Amendment required a warrant
when intelligence investigations concerned foreign powers. 35
Congress never stepped in to create a special regulatory regime to
govern domestic intelligence investigations. Congress did enact legislation
to govern foreign intelligence surveillance, though, after abuses by the
Intelligence Community were disclosed in the 1970s and led to enormous
public outcry. The Church and Pike congressional committees and
journalists revealed that the Nixon Administration and Intelligence
Community engaged in surveillance of anti-Vietnam War protestors,
among other unsavory acts.3 6 This led to the passage of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). FISA both empowered U.S.
intelligence to continue collecting foreign intelligence at a time when it was
feared the Supreme Court could possibly strike down the ability to conduct
foreign intelligence surveillance without prior judicial approval and
restricted the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance in the
United States. The law was a compromise between individuals that thought
a warrant should always be required, even for foreign intelligence
surveillance, and those who did not think that a warrant should ever be
required. In the end, Congress determined that a "judicial warrant should
be required whenever the [F]ourth [A]mendment rights of Americans might
37
be involved.,
FISA required the government to establish probable cause that the
"target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power"; probable cause that "each of the facilities or places at which
the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used,
by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power"; and that the proposed
minimization procedures are consistent with the statutory requirements. 38
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 300.
Id. at 320-23.
Id. at 321-23.

36. See, e.g., Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in US. Against Antiwar
Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1974), http://www.nytimes.com/
1974/12/22/archives/huge-cia-operation-reported-in-u-s-against-antiwar-forces-other.html?mcubz

=0&_r=0. See generally S. Rep. No. 94-755, supra note 19, at 25.
37.
38.

H.R. Rep. No 95-1283, pt. 2, at 68 (1978).
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 105, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2012).
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Electronic surveillance was defined as (1) the acquisition of the contents of
wire or radio communication when the target is a U.S. person in the United
States, (2) the acquisition of the contents of wire communication when at
least one party is in the United States and the collection itself occurs in the
United States, (3) the acquisition of the contents of radio communication
when all parties are in the United States, or (4) the installation of
"electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device" in the United
States. 39 FISA compelled the government to obtain approval from the
Foreign intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to conduct electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes inside the United States,
which created the first judicial oversight of foreign intelligence
investigations. The legislation's protections were focused on U.S. persons,
defined as
a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence... an unincorporated association a substantial
number of members of which are citizens of the United States or
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation
include a
which is incorporated in the United States, but does not
40
power.
foreign
a
is
which
association
an
or
corporation
FISA's restrictions on surveillance of U.S. persons were designed to guard
against intelligence abuse within the United States in its own domestic
political system. 4 ' The Act's protections for:
United States persons must therefore be understood as a crucial
safeguard of democratic accountability and effective selfgovernance within the American political system. In light of that
history and those concerns, there is good reason for every nation to
enact special restrictions on government surveillance of those
persons who participate directly in its own system of selfgovernance.

42

Minimization procedures are a set of rules that dictate how a government agency will limit the
accessibility, retention, and dissemination of inadvertently acquired material concerning U.S.
persons who are not the target of the surveillance. Id. § 1801(h).
39. Id. § 1801(f).
40. Id. § 1801(i).
41. The NSA has also developed internal policies and procedures "to ensure that the missions
and functions of the United States SIG[NST System (USSS) are conducted in a manner that
safeguards the constitutional rights of U.S. persons." See generally NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, U.S.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE (USSID) SP0018 (2011),
documents/I I 8/CLEANEDFinal%2OUSSID%20SP0018.pdf.

https://www.dni.gov/files/

RICHARD A. CLARKE ET. AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
42.
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Thus, the protections granted under FISA were part of the American
people's social contract with the state, and were not a recognition of
universal privacy rights.
The primary order organizing the Intelligence Community and
authorizing intelligence agencies to collect information not subject to
statutory regulation is also primarily concerned with protecting U.S.
persons' privacy rights. President Ronald Reagan fulfilled his 1980
campaign promise of providing more robust intelligence capabilities by
issuing Executive Order (EO) 12333 in 1981. EO 12333 stressed the need
for "[t]imely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities,
plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their
agents" by using "[a]ll reasonable and lawful means.., to ensure that the
United States will receive the best intelligence available.",44 Many
intelligence activities conducted under EO 12333 occur entirely outside of
the United States and do not implicate statutes such as FISA. EO 12333
specifically authorizes the NSA to "collect (including through clandestine
means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence
information and data for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
purposes to support national and departmental mission."4 5 The only
constraints in EO 12333 are focused on protecting U.S. persons. The Order
pledges that the "[U.S.] Government has a solemn obligation, and shall
continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order, to protect
fully the legal rights of all [U.S.] persons, including freedoms, civil
liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law.",46
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to the searches of foreigners outside of the United States in
Verdugo-Urquidez.4 ' Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and
resident of Mexico, was a leader of a violent drug cartel in Mexico and was
involved in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) Special Agent. 48 Verdugo-Urquidez was
apprehended in Mexico and transported to the U.S. border where he was
transferred to U.S. custody. 49 DEA Agents, working with Mexican police,
then searched Verdugo-Urquidez's properties in Mexico and seized
TECHNOLOGIES 154 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-1212_rg finalreport.pdf.
43.

Eric Manpearl, PresidentialElections: A Perilous Time for U.S. Intelligence, 4 LAWFARE

RES. PAPER SERIES, Sept. 2016, at 1, 24-25; Stephen B. Slick, The 2008 Amendments to Executive
Order 12333, United States IntelligenceActivities, 58 STUD. IN INTELLIGENCE, June 2014, at 1, 2.

44. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981).
45. Id, as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,085 (2003), Exec. Order No.
13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (2004), Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (2008).
46. Id.
47. Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. at 274-75.
48. Id.at 262.
49. Id.
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documents to use as evidence. 50 The Supreme Court determined that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by U.S. agents
of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. 51
The Court reasoned that the phrase "the people" in the Fourth Amendment
"refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community. 52 Therefore, the Supreme Court
embraced the Fourth Amendment's limited compact between the people
and their government, rather than a more global view in which the
Constitution would be a source of rights for all--even those outside of the
United States.
Finally, the U.S. intelligence reforms and surveillance programs
instituted after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have also focused
on providing privacy protections principally for U.S. persons while trying
to maximize operational effectiveness of the Intelligence Community.
Shortly after the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush
authorized the NSA to collect communications between people inside andoutside of the United States without a FISC order under the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP).53 The TSP was revealed in 2005 by the New
York Times and faced numerous legal challenges. Congress passed the,
Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA) to authorize the TSP by ensuring that
"electronic surveillance" would not be defined to include surveillance
"directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of the United
States." 54 Under the PAA, the FISC no longer had jurisdiction over
surveillance targeted at such individuals. Instead, the DNI and Attorney
General had the power to authorize such surveillance, and the FISC's only'.
role was to ensure that the procedures for determining the surveillance was
believed to be outside the United States were
targeted at persons reasonably
55
not "clearly erroneous."
Congress then passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) when
the PAA expired to enable the government to target non-U.S. persons
reasonably believed to be outside the United States to collect foreign
intelligence information. 56 Unlike traditional FISA surveillance,
surveillance under Section 702 of the FAA did not require a probable cause
standard that the target was a foreign power or agent of a foreign power and
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 265.

53.

James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TMES

(Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-withoutcourts.html?mcubz=0.
54. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105A, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
55.

Id. § 105C(c).

56. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012)).
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did not require individual FISC orders.57 Section 702 only required the
Attorney General and DNI to obtain approval for the targeting procedures,
minimization procedures, and certifications from the FISC, which then
enabled the government to compel cooperation by issuing directives to
companies. 58 The legal standard under Section 702 was less stringent than
FISA Title I surveillance, which was focused primarily on U.S. persons,
and the judicial oversight occurred less frequently than under FISA Title I.
Once the government obtained certification from the FISC under Section
702, the government could then issue directives to private sector companies
to compel the companies to cooperate with the government in the
surveillance.5 9 This is further evidence that U.S. intelligence efforts have
focused on protecting U.S. persons' privacy rights and have not been
concerned with the privacy interests of non-U.S. persons outside of the
United States.
II. UNAUTHORIZED

DISCLOSURES CAUSE AN INTERNATIONAL SCANDAL

In June 2013, then-NSA contractor Edward Snowden began leaking

classified information. 60 The disclosures occurred over an extended period
of time as Snowden provided classified documents to several journalists to
publish. 6' The vast majority of Snowden's disclosures did not concern
American's privacy rights. The disclosures mainly related to foreign
intelligence efforts targeting non-U.S. persons abroad and other military
and defense related programs. 62 Disclosures regarding the NSA's ability to
collect intelligence on foreigners and monitoring of the communications of
foreign officials produced enormous backlash from allied and partner
nations as well as from foreign consumers who became wary of U.S.
63
technology companies.
57.

Id.

58.
59.

Id.
Id.

60. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-

phone-records-verizon-court-order.
61. See generally HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REVIEW OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CONTRACTOR EDWARD

SNOWDEN (2016), http://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hpsci-snowdenreview.pdf.
62. Id. at i.
63.

See, e.g., Jacob Appelbaum et al., Did US Tap ChancellorMerkel's Mobile Phone?, DER

SPIEGEL (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/merkel-calls-obama-oversuspicions-us-tapped-her-mobile-phone-a-929642.html (describing the German government's anger
over allegations that the United States had monitored Chancellor Angela Merkel's phone); Sven
Becker et al., Inside Snowden's Germany File, DER SPIEGEL (June 18, 2014), http://www.
spiegel.de/intemational/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441 -d
ruck.html (exploring the NSA's intelligence collection efforts in Germany and detailing the public
resentment in Germany from the revelations); Brazil and Mexico Probe Claims U.S. Spied on
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The German government and public were particularly critical of the
United States and NSA as a result of the unauthorized disclosures. 64 The
United States engaged in extensive surveillance efforts in Germany largely
because of the country's Internet exchange points, especially in Frankfurt,
in which data from Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East all pass
through. 65 This level of monitoring was deeply unsettling to a country that
had experienced oppressive fascist and socialist regimes that engaged in
massive surveillance. 66 Further, the disclosures revealed that the United
States had monitored German Chancellor Angela Merkel's cell phone
communications. 67 This was deemed a great affront to Merkel, who had
grown up in communist East Germany under the Stasi's watchful eye, as
allies.6 8
the United States and Germany had developed into extremely close
These revelations came amidst Germany's 2013 federal elections and
created domestic political pressure on Merkel to push back against the
United States. The Chancellor expressed her displeasure to President
Obama on several occasions. 69 In July 2013 Merkel declared: "The
monitoring of friends-this is unacceptable, it can't be tolerated," and she,"
repeated similar scoldings over the course of the scandal. 70 The disclosures
also put hopes that the United States and Europe could reach a free trade
agreement, known as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), in great jeopardy.7 '
Presidents, BBC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23938909
(discussing the backlash from Brazil and Mexico upon the allegations that the United States had
monitored the communications of those countries' presidents); SPIEGEL Staff, The NSA's Secret
Spy Hub in Berlin, DER SPIEGEL (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
(analyzing
cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.htmI
the diplomatic rift between the United States and Germany).
64. See, e.g., Appelbaum et al., supra note 63 (reporting on Chancellor Merkel's public
criticisms of NSA activities).
65. Chris Bryant, Spying Questions Emerge Over Frankfurt'sData Hub, FIN. TIMES (July 4,
2013), https://www.ft.com/content/a3e573ce-e3fd- 11 e2-91 a3-00144feabdcO.
66. Konstantin Von Notz, The Challenge of Limiting Intelligence Agencies' Mass
SurveillanceRegimes, in PRIVACY AND POWER: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE
NSA-AFFAIR 333, 338-39 (Russell A. Miller ed. 2017).
67. The NSA 's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, supra note 63.
68. Dagmar Hovestddt, Germany's Stasi PastLooms Over NSA Spying Furor,CNN (Oct. 29,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/opinion/nsa-germany-stasi-shadows/.
69. See, e.g., Gregory Peter Schmitz, Experts Warn of Trans-AtlanticIce Age, DER SPIEGEL
(July 1, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/intemationa/world/trans-atlantic-relations-threatened-byrevelations-of-mass-us-spying-a-908746.html ("Merkel confirmed that she had already voiced her
displeasure to the White House over the weekend and has demanded a full explanation."); The NSA's
Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, supra note 63 ("Last Wednesday Merkel placed a strongly worded phone
call to [U.S.] President Barack Obama"); see also David E. Sanger & Alison Smale, U.S.-Germany
Intelligence PartnershipFalterOver Spying, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
l ? m c u bz 2013/12/17/world/europe/us-germany-intelligence-partnership-falters-over-spying.htm
70. Schmitz, supra note 69 (Chancellor Merkel stated: "The monitoring of friends-this is
unacceptable, it can't be tolerated"); The NSA 's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, supra note 63 (Chancellor
Merkel declared: "Spying between friends, that's just not done").
71. Schmitz, supra note 69.
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Even after Germany's election, in which Angela Merkel and her
Christian Democratic Union party emerged victorious, Merkel and
Germany continued to express displeasure and push back against the United
States. In October 2013, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle
summoned the U.S. ambassador to Germany, John Emerson, a highly
unusual diplomatic step, which indicated how deeply troubled Germany
was by the revelations. 72 The United States feared the diplomatic rift and
continuing public pressure in Germany would limit the country's ability to
share intelligence with the United States, which would have constituted a
73
blow to U.S. intelligence.
Snowden's unauthorized disclosures also revealed that the NSA
74
engaged in surveillance across Latin America, especially in Brazil.
Reports indicated that the NSA intercepted President Dilma Roussef's own
communications and accused the United States of spying on the stateowned oil company Petrobras. 7 5 This angered then-Brazil President Dilma
Roussef and led her to cancel a planned visit to the White House in October
2013, which would have been the first visit to the White House by a
Brazilian president since 1995, and constituted a major diplomatic affront. 76
President Roussef also faced domestic political pressure that helped spur
such vocal push back against the United States.7 7
In October 2013, Brazil and German diplomats pushed for the adoption
of a resolution recognizing an international right to privacy online that
would apply extraterritorially at the United Nations.78 U.S. diplomats
72. Alison Smale, U.S. Envoy is Summoned by Germany over Spying Report, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/world/europe/anger-growing-over-unitedstates-surveillance.html; Severin Weiland, German Foreign Minister Summons US. Ambassador,
DER SPIEGEL (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/germany/westerwelle-summons-

us-ambassador-over-merkel-cell-phone-spying-a-929708.html.
73. Lisa Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, White
House, Keynote Address at the Intelligence Studies Project Conference: Intelligence in American
Society (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.intelligence studies.utexas.edu/events/item/509-conferenceon-intelligence-in-american-society-with-homeland-security-advisor-lisa-monaco.
74.

US Allies Mexico, Chile and Brazil Seek Spying Answers, BBC NEWS (July 11, 2013),

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23267440.
75. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff Calls off U.S. Trip, BBC NEWS (Sept.17, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-24133161.
76. Id.; Simon Romero, Brazil's Leader Postpones State Visit to Washington over Spying,
N.Y. TIES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/world/americas/brazils-leade r-

postpones-state-visit-to-us.html.
77.

See Romero, supranote 76 ("Ahead of 2014 elections, Ms. Rousseff stands to gain among

some elements within the governing Workers Party by meeting their demands for a strong response
on the spying issue.").
78. Colum Lynch, Exclusive: Inside America's Plan to Kill Online Privacy Rights
Everywhere, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 20, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/20/exclusiveinside-americas-plan-to-kilI-online-privacy-rights-everywhere/
[hereinafter Lynch, Exclusive:
Inside America's Plan to Kill Online Privacy Rights Everywhere]; Colum Lynch, Shane Harris &
John Hudson, Exclusive: Germany, Brazil Turn to U.N. to RestrainAmerican Spies, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Oct. 24, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/24/exclusive-germany-brazil-turn-to-u-n-to-
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worked to modify the original resolution so that it did not specifically refer
to "extraterritorial surveillance" and instead was consistent with the
obligations under the ICCPR.79 While the United States was ultimately
successful at preventing the resolution from applying extraterritorially, this
international backlash following the
further demonstrates the broad
80
activities.
NSA
of
disclosures
Also, foreign consumers became concerned about U.S. surveillance.
Foreign consumers were distrustful of U.S. technology products and online
services because they feared their communications would be accessible to
U.S. law enforcement or intelligence agencies. 8 1 U.S. companies saw
immediate drops in revenue and worried about their long-term economic
82
viability in foreign markets based on the fallout from the disclosures.
The United States responded to this intense backlash by instituting
voluntary surveillance reforms. The United States pledged to not use
electronic surveillance against political figures in allied countries and gave
an unprecedented grant of rights to non-U.S. persons that insinuate83 that,
foreigners have privacy rights within the U.S. system of governance.
III. THE UNPRECEDENTED EXPANSION OF PRIVACY PROTECTIONS TO
NON-U.S. PERSONS

A. PresidentialPolicy Directive 28
On January 17, 2014, President Obama issued PPD-28 on signals
intelligence activities. PPD-28 asserted that:
our signals intelligence activities must take into account that all
persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their
nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons have
legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal
restrain-american-spies/.
79. Lynch, Exclusive: Inside America's Plan to Kill Online PrivacyRights Everywhere, supra
note 78.
80. G.A. Res. 68/167 (Jan. 21, 2014).
81. See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies,
N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snow denhurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html (discussing the increased skepticism by foreign
consumers of U.S. technology products and services following the Snowden disclosures).
82. See, e.g., Michael Birnbaum, Germany Looks at Keeping Its Internet, E-mail Traffic
Inside Its Borders, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/
2
germany-looks-at-keeping-its-internet-e-mail-traffic-inside-its-borders/ 013/10/31/981104fe-424f1le3-a751-f032898f2dbc story.html?utm term=.9Oc6f9c44bdc (detailing the negative impact of
the disclosures on U.S. businesses).
83. PPD-28, supra note 1; President Barack Obama, Remarks on United States Signals
Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance Programs (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/DCPD-201400030/pdf/DCPD-201400030.pdf.
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information.
In light of the evolving technological and
geopolitical environment, we must continue to ensure that our
signals intelligence policies and practices appropriately take into
account our alliances and other partnerships; the leadership role that
the United States plays in upholding democratic principles and
universal human rights; the increased globalization of trade,
investment, and information flows; our commitment to an open,
interoperable and secure global Internet; and the legitimate privacy
and civil liberties concerns of U.S. citizens and citizens of other
84
nations.
Section 1 stated that the "United States shall not collect signals
intelligence for the purpose of suppressing or :burdening criticism or
dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race,
gender, sexual orientation, or religion" and clarified that "[s]ignals
intelligence shall be collected exclusively where there is a foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence purpose. 85 This section also declared
that the United States would not conduct SIGINT to collect "private
commercial information or trade secrets" for non-national security
purposes or collect intelligence to provide to the U.S. private sector for
those firms' economic benefit. 86 These requirements did not depart from
the already existing practice for intelligence collection. The Intelligence
Community already focused solely on foreign and counterintelligence
activities as limited resources and a plethora of threats dictated a strict
focus on legitimate intelligence collection. Further, the President already
approves the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which
directs the Intelligence Community to collect intelligence regarding topics
reviewed by the National Security Council's (NSC's) Principals
Committee. 87 In addition, while the United States does use intelligence to
detect sanctions or trade rules violations, to find when governments are
aiding commercial firms, to monitor dangerous dual-use technologies, and
to understand bribery practices, the United States has had a long-standing
policy and practice of not engaging in economic espionage to benefit U.S.
88
firms.

204:

84.
85.
86.

PPD-28, supra note 1.
PPD-28, supra note 1, § 1.
Id.

87.

See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE

NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

PRIORITIES

FRAMEWORK

(2015),

https://www.dni.gov/

files/documents/ICD/ICD%20204%2ONationa%2
/1ntelligence%2OPririties%2oFramework.pdf
(NIPF from 2015 after PPD-28 was issued); OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

INTELLIGENCE

PRIORITIES

DIRECTIVE 204: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE NATIONAL

FRAMEWORK

(2007),

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/

ICD_204.pdf(NIPF from 2007 before PPD-28 was issued).
88.

COMM'N ON THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE CMTY., PREPARING

FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE 23 (1996) (noting that the United
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Section 2 limited bulk SIGINT collection "to protect the privacy and
civil liberties of all persons, whatever their nationality and regardless of
where they might reside." 89 The Directive only authorized the use of bulk
SIG1NT collection to detect and counter:
(1) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign
powers or their intelligence services against the United States and its
interests; (2) threats to the United States and its interests from
terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its interests from the
development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass
destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; (5) threats to U.S. or allied
Armed Forces or other U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational
evasion
criminal threats, including illicit finance and sanctions
9
related to the other purposes named in this section. 0
The limitations on bulk collection did not apply to SIGINT information
that is "temporarily acquired to facilitate targeted collection." 9 ' Section 2
also maintains flexibility in intelligence gathering by calling for the list to
92
be updated as necessary to meet national security requirements.
However, the approved categories in Section 2 do not include political
93
intelligence regarding the plans and intentions of foreign governments.
Thus, Section 2 appears to restrict the Intelligence Community from using
bulk SIGINT to collect on one of its core missions.
Section 3 required the department and agency heads that participate in
the process for establishing SIGINT priorities and requirements to
94
annually review the intelligence needs of their department or agencies.
The purpose of this section was to recognize that some collection efforts
are politically sensitive and can cause blowback if improperly disclosed
so national security decision makers should continuously assess the value
of such programs to determine if they should continue. Section 3,
States has a "policy and practice prohibiting intelligence agencies from clandestinely collecting
proprietary information of foreign commercial firms to benefit private firms in the United States.
The role of the Intelligence Community is to provide support to the Government, not to the private
sector."); James Woolsey, Former Dir., Cent. Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Gathering and

Democracies: The Issue of Economic and Industrial Espionage (Mar. 7, 2000), https://fas.org/irp/
news/2000/03/wool0300.htm (discussing the limited areas in which U.S. intelligence collects
information in the economic area).
89.

PPD-28, supra note 1, § 2.

90.

Id.

91. Id. n.5.
92. Id. § 2.
93. But cf Benjamin Wittes, President'sSpeech and PPD-28: A Guide for the Perplexed,
LAWFARE (Jan. 20, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/presidents-speech-and-ppd-28-guide-

perplexed (arguing that PPD-28 Section 2 likely did not alter the U.S. existing practices as
intelligence agencies likely only used bulk SIGINT for these legitimate national security reasons).
94.

PPD-28, supra note 1, § 3.
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therefore, seeks to reinforce the foreign policy considerations that are
present in determining whether to proceed with sensitive intelligence
collection activities based on the costs and benefits of such activities.
Finally, Section 4 does the majority of the substantive work of the
Directive. Section 4 echoes the privacy protective tone of the Directive,
stating:
All persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of
their nationality or wherever they might reside, and all persons have
legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal
information. U.S. signals intelligence activities must, therefore,
include appropriate safeguards for the personal information of all
individuals, regardless of the nationality of the individual to whom
the information pertains or where that individual resides." 95
Section 4 reforms the minimization procedures for non-U.S. persons by
requiring that "[t]o the maximum extent feasible consistent with the
national security, these policies and procedures are to be applied equally to
the personal information of all persons, regardless of nationality., 96
Specifically, this section limited the dissemination and retention of nonU.S. persons' personal information. Section 4 required that non-U.S.
persons' "[p]ersonal information shall be disseminated only if the
dissemination of comparable information concerning U.S. persons would
be permitted under section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333. ' 9 Retention of
non-U.S. persons':
[p]ersonal information shall be retained only if the retention of
comparable information concerning U.S. persons would be permitted
under section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333 and shall be subject to
the same retention periods as applied to comparable information
concerning U.S. persons. Information for which no such
determination has been made shall not be retained for more than 5
years, unless the DNI expressly determines that continued retention
is in the national security interests of the United States. 98
Section 2.3 of EO 12333 limits collection, retention, and dissemination
of information concerning U.S. persons to information that (a) is publicly
available or collected with the person's consent; (b) constitutes foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence; (c) is obtained during a "lawful foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence, international drug or international
95. Id. §4.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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terrorism investigation"; (d) is needed for public safety; (e) is needed to
protect intelligence sources, methods, and programs from unauthorized
disclosure; (f) concerns people that might reasonably be potential sources

to "determin[e] their suitability or credibility"; (g) arises from a "lawful
personnel, physical, or communications security investigation"; (h) is
obtained by "overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific [U.S.]
denote unlawful activity; and
persons"; (i) is incidentally obtained but may
99
reasons.
administrative
(j) is necessary for
The Directive remarkably recognized that non-U.S. persons have
privacy interests and deserve privacy protections in U.S. SIG1NT
activities. 0 0 This declaration was unprecedented not only in U.S. history
99. Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.3, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981), as amended by Exec. Order No.
13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4085 (2003), Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (2004), Exec. Order
No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (2008).
100. The United States also enacted the Judicial Redress Act of 2015 as a result of the Snowden
disclosures. The Act extended certain Privacy Act remedies to citizens of certain designated foreign
countries. The Judicial Redress Act was deemed necessary to ensure that the United States and
European Union could reach a new data sharing agreement after the Schrems decision meant that the
Safe Harbor agreement could no longer be relied upon by companies as a way of ensuring that they
were in compliance with E.U. data protection requirements. The ECJ determined that "legislation
not providing for any possibility for an individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access
to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data" violates the
right to effective judicial protection under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Schrems, supra note 4, 95. Also, in December 2016, the European Union approved the Data
Protection and Privacy Agreement (DPPA), or "Umbrella Agreement," that was reached between
the United States and European Union regarding privacy protections for personal information that is
transferred between the United States and European Union to prevent, detect, investigate, or
prosecute criminal offenses. Article 19 of the DPPA stated that the parties to the agreement had to
provide, in their domestic law, judicial redress for each other's citizens regarding the "(a) denial by
a Competent Authority of access to records containing his or her personal information; (b) denial by
a Competent Authority of amendment of records containing his or her personal information; and (c)
unlawful disclosure of such information that has been willfully or intentionally made, which shall
include the possibility of compensatory damages." Agreement Between the United States of America
and the European Union on the Protection of Personal Information Relating to the Prevention,
Investigation, Detection, and Prosecution of Criminal Offenses art. 19, June 2, 2016,
https://www.justice.gov/opcllDPPA/download. The United States enacted the Judicial Redress Act
to implement Article 19 of the DPPA. Under the Act, the Attorney General is responsible for
designating a foreign country as a "covered country," but must receive concurrence from the
Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Secretary of Homeland Security before making
this designation. Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, § 2(d), 130 Stat. 282. The Act
also lays out specific criteria that the Attorney General must adhere to when designating a country
as "covered," including that "the Attorney General has certified that the policies regarding the
transfer of personal data for commercial purposes and related actions of the country or regional
economic integration organization, or member country of such organization, do not materially
impede the national security interest of the United States." Id.at § 2(c), 130 Stat. 283. As of January
2017, all countries that have been designated as "covered" by the Attorney General are European
nations. Judicial Redress Act of 2015; Attorney General Designations, 82 Fed. Reg. 7860 (Jan. 23,
2017). Under the Judicial Redress Act, an individual from a designated country can bring a civil
action against a U.S. government agency if the U.S. agency intentionally or willfully unlawfully
disclosed a record about that individual such that it had an adverse effect on the individual. Judicial
Redress Act of 2015 § 2(a)(1). An individual from a designated country can also bring a suit against
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but also internationally as no other country has ever made a similar
pronouncement to publicly commit to respecting foreigners' privacy in
intelligence collection. 101 PPD-28 was clearly a diplomatic response to the
scandal brought on by the Snowden disclosures, but the question remains

whether the Directive was solely a foreign policy action aimed at diffusing
the controversy and mollifying important allies, especially Germany, or
whether the Directive was a fundamental re-evaluation of who has privacy

rights under the law.
B. Implementationof PresidentialPolicy Directive 28
PPD-28 required the Intelligence Community to report on the status of
implementing Section 4.112 The agencies most affected by the Directive's
SIGINT reforms were the FBI, the CIA, and most of all the NSA.
a designated federal agency or component if that designated agency or component improperly refuses
to grant access or to amend a covered record. Id. at § 2(a)(2). The Attorney General is responsible
for determining which agencies or components are considered a "designated" agency or component
and thus subject to suits by citizens of certain designated foreign countries for improperly refusing
to grant access or to amend a covered record. Id. § 2(e), 130 Stat. 283-84. As of January 2017, the
Attorney General had designated the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security,
Securities and Exchange Commission, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission as
"designated" agencies, including all of their respective components. Judicial Redress Act of 2015;
Attorney General Designations, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7861 (Jan. 23, 2017). The Attorney General had also
designated the Bureau of Diplomatic Security in the Department of State; Office of the Inspector
General in the Department of State; Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau in the Department
of the Treasury; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in the Department of the Treasury; Internal
Revenue Service in the Division of Criminal Investigation in the Department of the Treasury; Office
of Foreign Assets Control in the Department of the Treasury; Office of the Inspector General in the
Department of the Treasury; Office of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration in the
Department of the Treasury; and Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
in the Department of the Treasury as "designated" components of a federal agency. Id. This means
that many of the agencies and components of federal agencies in the Intelligence Community are not
subject to suits by citizens of certain designated foreign countries for improperly refusing to grant
access or to amend a covered record under the Judicial Redress Act because they are not "designated"
agencies or components. Further, the Privacy Act's exemptions and exceptions still apply to citizens
of certain designated foreign countries. Judicial Redress Act of 2015 § 2(c), 130 Stat. 282. Under the
Privacy Act, a system of records may be deemed exempt if it is maintained by the CIA. 5 U.S.C. §
552a(j)(1) (2012). Also, certain systems of records that are maintained by an agency or component
that performs a law enforcement function as a principal part of its functions are exempt from the
Privacy Act. Id. §§ 552a(j)(2), 552a(k)(2). Further, the Privacy Act has a specific exemption for
systems of records that are properly classified. Id. § 552a(k)(1). Thus, the Intelligence Community
will very likely not be affected by the Judicial Redress Act at all because these agencies' systems of
records are exempt from the Privacy Act. See Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 80 Fed. Reg.
63749, 63751-52 (Oct. 21, 2015) (NSA exempting its systems of records from the Privacy Act).
101. See Wittes, supra note 93; President Obama's NSA Reforms Speech: What Are the
Implicationsfor Privacy, Commerce andNationalSecurity, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 17,2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/events/president-obamas-nsa-reforms-speech-what-are-the-implication
s-for-privacy-commerce-and-national-security/.
102. PPD-28 § 4(b); see Signals Intelligence Reform 2015 Anniversary Report, IC ON THE
RECORD (Feb. 3, 2015), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-28/2015/privacy-civil-liberties# ppd28 (compiling intelligence agencies' policies and procedures produced to comply with PPD-28).
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Although the FBI does not conduct SIGINT, the FBI applied PPD-28 to
information that the Bureau collects under FISA Section 702.03 The FBI
echoed PPD-28's dissemination limitations, stating that it "will disseminate
personal information of non-U.S. persons collected pursuant to Section 702
of FISA only if dissemination of comparable information concerning U.S.
persons would be permitted under Section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333"
and "only if the information relates specifically to an activity authorized by
the Attorney General or an intelligence requirement authorized by the
Director of National Intelligence, and not solely because of the person's
foreign status." 10 4 The FBI also adopted verbatim PPD-28's retention
limitations, prohibiting the retention of "unevaluated personal information
concerning non-U.S. persons collected pursuant to section 702 of FISA for
longer than five (5) years, unless retention of comparable information
concerning U.S. persons would be permitted under section 2.3 of Executive
Order 12333. " 1° 5 Further, the FBI stated it would
retain personal information concerning a non-U.S. person collected
pursuant to section 702 of FISA that is foreign intelligence only if
the information relates specifically to an activity authorized by the
Attorney General or an intelligence requirement authorized by the
and not solely because of the
Director of National Intelligence,
06
person's foreign status.1
The CIA sought to limit bulk SIGINT collection in its implementation
procedures in addition to specifying dissemination and retention
procedures. The implementation procedures stated that the "Agency should
conduct targeted SIGINT collection activities rather than bulk SIGINT
collection activities when practicable. SIGINT collection activities should
be directed against specific foreign intelligence targets or topics through the
use of discriminants (e.g., specific facilities, identifiers, selection terms,
etc.) when practicable."' 1 7 The CIA excluded SIGINT activities in support
of "human intelligence (HUMINT) operations; covert action; FBI
predicated law enforcement investigations other than those conducted
solely for purposes of acquiring foreign intelligence; or military operations
in an area of active hostilities" from the limitation on bulk SIGINT
collection. 10 8 The CIA's procedures restricted the use of SIGINT collected
103.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 28: POLICIES AND

PROCEDURES

1

(2015),

https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ppd-28-policies-procedures-signed.

pdf/view.
104. Id.at2.
105. Id.at3.
106. Id.
107. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY 2 (2015), https://www.
cia.gov/library/reports/Policy-and-Procedures-for-CIA-Signals-Intelligence-Activities.pdf
108. Id.
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in bulk to detecting or countering the specific threats stated in PPD-28
Section 2.109 This excludes bulk SIGINT collection on political intelligence
regarding the plans and intentions of foreign governments, which is a core
mission of the CIA. Further, the procedures limit the dissemination of nonU.S. persons' personal information to information that relates to an
"authorized intelligence requirement, and cannot be disseminated solely
because of the person's foreign status." 110 Dissemination to a foreign
government is restricted to situations when the dissemination is in the U.S.
interest and complies with applicable laws, Executive Orders, and
policies.' 11 Retention of non-U.S. person information was limited to five
years unless the information falls within categories consistent with Section
2.3 of EO 12333 or the DNI determines that continued retention serves the
U.S. national security interest. 112 The CIA's procedures allowed the
Director of the CIA to approve an exception to the regulation and "notify,
and if practicable consult in advance, the ODNI and the National Security
Division (NSD) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)."' " 13
The NSA was most affected by PPD-28 because it is the Intelligence
Community's functional manager for SIGINT collection. 114 The NSA's
procedures restricted the use of nonpublic communications collected in
bulk to detecting and countering the specific threats stated in PPD-28
Section 2."1' Again, this excludes bulk SIGINT collection on political
intelligence regarding the plans and intentions of foreign governments.
Non-U.S. persons' personal information may only be disseminated if the
information was obtained with the person's consent or if the information
"(i) is publicly available; (ii) is related to an authorized foreign intelligence
requirement; (iii) is related to a crime that has been, is being, or is about to
be committed; or (iv) indicates a possible threat to the safety of any person
or organization." 116 The dissemination procedures clarify that personal
information may not be disseminated solely because the person is
foreign. 1 17 Retention of nonpublic communications acquired by SIGINT
that contain non-U.S. persons' personal information is limited to five years
unless the information could by disseminated under this set of procedures
or the DNI, or the DNI's designee, determines continued retention is in the
109. Id. at3.
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id.at 6.
112. Id. at4.
113. Id. at 6-7.
114. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R § 200, (1981), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,284,
68 Fed. Reg. 4085 (2003), Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (2004), Exec. Order No.
13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (2008).
115. NAT'L. SEC. AGENCY, PPD-28 SECTION 4 PROCEDURES § 5.2 (2015), https://fas.org/irp/

nsa/nsa-ppd-28.pdf.
116. Id.§7.2.
117.

Id.
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U.S. national security interest. 118 Information that has been acquired but not
"processed into an intelligible form because of unknown communications
methods, encryption, or other methods of concealing secret meaning is not
subject to the [five year] retention limit" and the retention period does not
begin until the information is made intelligible. " 9 Finally, the NSA's
procedures did allow for the Director of the NSA or a designee to authorize
the departure from these procedures in extraordinary circumstances after
consulting with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
NSD of DOJ, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 120 In
emergency situations, the Director of the NSA or a senior official present
may approve the departure from the procedures without this consultation
preceding the decision, and the General Counsel of the NSA will then
provide prompt notice to ODNI, NSD of DOJ, and OSD.121
IV. A

LEGAL UNDERPINNING FOR THIS EXPANSION OF
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS?

PPD-28's recognition that non-U.S. persons have "legitimate privacy
interests" and grant of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons was a major
break with prior U.S intelligence law and policy. 122 PPD-28 went beyond
the social contract that had been the underpinning of surveillance and
privacy protections since America's founding. This raises the important
question of what is the basis, if any, for universal privacy rights.
A. The UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights
The UDHR is the cornerstone of human rights in the modem world. The
UDHR was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, with the
atrocities of World War II fresh in the minds of world leaders.123 Article 12
of the UDHR declared: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."' 124 While Article 12 of the UDHR
proclaimed that a right to privacy existed, the UDHR never defined this
right and did not explain what constitutes an arbitrary interference of the
right. Also, the UDHR did not create any legal rights or obligations on

118. Jd. § 6.1(a)-(b).
119. Id. § 6.1(a).
120. Id. § 1.5.
121. Id. § 1.6.
122. PPD-28, supra note 1.
123. G.A. Res. 217 (1Il)A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
124. Id. art. 12.
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countries. 125 The UDHR was instead solely intended as a proclamation of
"standards of conduct which all Members of the United Nations
should
126
endeavor to attain."'

B. The InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights
The ICCPR was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966 as one
of two covenants that were intended to implement the UDHR. 127 The other
covenant adopted to implement the UDHR was the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 128 Together these
covenants are referred to as the "International Bill of Human Rights."' 129
Article 17 of the ICCPR declared: "1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."' 3 °
Similar to Article 12 of the UDHR, the ICCPR did not define the right to
privacy and did not elaborate on what constitutes an arbitrary interference
into this right.
Article 17's right to privacy is not an absolute right. The right to privacy
may be interfered with if the interference is lawful under domestic law that
is accessible to the public, pursues a legitimate aim, and is necessary and
proportional.' 3 1 The United States interprets Article 17 to require that
"interference with privacy must be in accordance with transparent laws and
32
must not be arbitrary."'1

Regardless, the United States takes the position that the ICCPR does not
apply extraterritorially, and therefore does not apply to foreign intelligence
125. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1948
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES THEREIN

130 (1949), https://archive.org/stream/usparticipationi 1948unit/usparticipationi I 948uni tdjvu.txt.
126. Id.
127. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORE HUMAN RIGHTS

TREATIES

AND TREATY

BODIES

6-7

(2005),

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/

FactSheet30en.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1153, 1164 n.53 (1998).

130. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
131. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/69/397, at 12 (Sept. 23, 2014)
(explaining that the right to privacy is not an absolute right and discussing when the right to privacy
may be interfered with).

132. PERMANENT MISSION OF THE U.S. TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INT'L ORGS. IN
GENEVA, ONE-YEAR FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO PRIORITY
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON ITS FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 12 (2015).
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collection targeting non-U.S. persons outside of the United States. Article
2(1) of the ICCPR states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
political or other
133
other status.
The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 but the Senate did not
134
In 1995, the United
examine its extraterritoriality upon ratification.
States stated its position that
[t]he Covenant was not regarded as having extraterritorial
application. In general, where the scope of application of a treaty was
not specified, it was presumed to apply only within a party's
territory. Article 2 of the Covenant expressly stated that each State
party undertook to respect and ensure the rights recognized "to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction". That
dual requirement restricted the scope of the Covenant to persons
under [U.S.] jurisdiction and within [U.S.] territory. During the
egotiating history, the words "within its territory" had been debated
and were added by vote, with the clear understanding that such
wording would limit the obligations to within a Party's territory. 135,
The United States has continued to focus on the specific text and
negotiating history of Article 2(1) in its combined second and third periodic
report to the U.N. Committee on Human Rights concerning the ICCPR in
2005 and in its fourth periodic report to the U.N. Committee on Human
Rights concerning the ICCPR in 2011 to explain why the United States does
not view the ICCPR as applying extraterritorially. 136 Although the U.S.
position that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially is a minority
133. ICCPR, art. 2(1).
134. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992) (not considering whether the
ICCPR applied extraterritorially or not).
20, U.N. Doc.
135. U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg.,
CCPR/C/SR. 1405 (Mar. 31, 1995) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Comm., Summary Record of the
1405th Meeting: United States ofAmerica].
136. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT

ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

annex I (2005), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/55504.htm

[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

505 (2011), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/1 79781 .htm.
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position, the United States has consistently adhered to this view. 137
Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, which
serves as a guide for treaty interpretation, states that "[a] treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
purpose."' 138 The plain and ordinary meaning of the text of Article 2(1) of
the ICCPR is that "State Parties are required to ensure the rights in the
Covenant only to individuals who are both within the territory of a State
139
Party and subject to that State party's sovereign authority."
Also, the draft text of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR originally used the
phrase "within its jurisdiction," but this was specifically amended because
of concern regarding the broad scope of application that would occur with
137. Joseph Cannataci, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy has argued: "Art
12 of the UNDHR and Art 17 of the ICCPR do not state that the right to privacy is a right which is
only enjoyed by the citizens of one's own state. I very strongly maintain that the right to privacy of
every citizen of the world should be safeguarded in laws governing surveillance and that the
distinction between one's own citizens and 'foreigners' is useless in practice and not in compliance
with the principles of the universal right to privacy." The FundamentalHuman Right to Privacy Does

Not Depend on the Passportin Your Pocket, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH

COMM'R (Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?News
ID=20747&LangID=E. See Ashley Deeks, Does the ICCPR Establish an ExtraterritorialRight to
Privacy?,LAWFARE (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-iccpr-establish-extraterrit
orial-right-privacy (explaining that the United States has "long argued that the ICCPR does not apply
extra-territorially, because the U.S. government reads the scope requirement as limiting the treaty to
activity within U.S. territory," but recognizing that this is a minority position). But see Marko
Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and ForeignSurveillance:Privacy in the DigitalAge, 56 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 81, 108 (2015) (acknowledging that the United States takes the position that the ICCPR
does not apply extraterritorially, which is a minority viewpoint, but arguing the U.S. position has not
been long-standing because it was only articulated for the first time in 1995). In 2010, Professor
Harold Koh, then-Legal Adviser of the Department of State, drafted an internal memo arguing that
the United States should abandon its position that the ICCPR categorically does not apply
extraterritorially. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2010),

https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/state-department-iccpr-memo.pdf.
However, the Obama Administration rejected Professor Koh's position that the ICCPR imposes
certain obligations on a state party outside of the state's borders. Administration officials rejected
Professor Koh's perspective primarily because of concerns that abandoning the position that the
ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially could cause the United States to have to drastically alter its
detention and targeted killing policies. Charlie Savage, US. Seems Unlikely to Accept That Rights
Treaty Applies to Its Actions Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/201 4 /0 3 / 0 7 /world/us-seems-unlikely-to-accept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-its_
actions-abroad. html?mcubz=O.
138. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, but still "generally
recognizes the Convention as an authoritative guide to principles of treaty interpretation." U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT, supra note 136, n.4. See, e.g., Fujitsu, Ltd. v. Fed.

Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001) (asserting that the Vienna Convention on the Laws
of Treaties is "an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties").
139. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT, supra note 136, annex I
(emphasis in original).
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this language. 140 Eleanor Roosevelt, the U.S. representative and thenChairman of the Commission on Human Rights, expressed the U.S. concern
that the United States did not want to assume "an obligation to ensure the
rights recognized in [the ICCPR] to citizens of countries under [U.S.]

occupation."' 141 Thus, on behalf of the United States, Eleanor Roosevelt
proposed to amend Article 2(1) to use the phrase "within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction."' 142 She explained:
The purpose of the proposed addition was to make it clear that the
draft Covenant would apply only to persons within the territory and

subject to the jurisdiction of contracting States. The United States
was afraid that without such an addition the draft Covenant might be
construed as obliging the contracting States to enact legislation
concerning persons who, although outside its territory were

technically within its jurisdiction for certain purposes. An illustration
would be the occupied territories of Germany, Austria and Japan:

persons within those countries were subject to the jurisdiction of the
occupying States in certain respects, but were outside the scope of
the legislation of those States. Another illustration would be the case

of leased territories: some countries leased certain territories from
others for limited purposes, and there might be questions of
conflicting authority between the lessor nation and the lessee
nation. 143
adopted. 14 4
Ultimately, the U.S. proposed amendment to Article 2(1) was
Thus, under the U.S. long-standing interpretation that the ICCPR does not
140. Article 2(1) originally read: "Each State party hereto undertakes to ensure all individuals
within its jurisdiction the rights defined in this Covenant." U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights,
6th Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/365 (Mar. 22, 1950), http://dag.un.orgibitstream/handle/1 1176/
259695/E CN.4_365-EN.pdfsequence= l&isAllowed=y.
141. U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 194th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/SR.194 (May 16, 1950), http://uvallsc.s3.amazonaws.com/travaux/s3fs-public/E-CN 4SR 194.pdf?null. See also U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 193d mtg. at 13, 18,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.193 (May 15, 1950) (Mrs. Roosevelt), http://uvallsc.s3.amazonaws.com/
travaux/s3fs-public/E-CN_4-SR_193 0.pdfnull.
142. U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/365 (Mar.
22, 1950), http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/259695/ECN.4 365-EN.pdtsequence=l&is
Allowed=y (U.S. proposal). See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT,
supra note 136, annex 1.
143. U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 138th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.138 (Mar. 29, 1950), http://uvallsc.s3.amazonaws.com/travaux/s3fs-public/E-CN 4SR138.pdf?null. See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT, supra note
136, annex I.
144. U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., 194th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.194 (May 16, 1950), http://uvallsc.s3.amazonaws.com/travaux/s3fs-public/E-CN 4SR_194.pdf~null. See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT, supra note
136, annex I.
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apply extraterritorially, Article 17's right to privacy does not apply to nonU.S. persons in SIGINT collection because these individuals are not both
within the U.S. territory and subject to the U.S. jurisdiction. Further, the
Senate advice and consent to the ICCPR declared that "the provisions of
Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing." 14 5 Although
the ICCPR is considered "supreme Law of the Land" under the U.S.
Constitution because it is a treaty, 146 it is not a self-executing treaty and
therefore it does not bind U.S. courts. 147 This means that the ICCPR does
148
not "provide a cause of action in [U.S.] courts.
C. The European Convention on Human Rights
The ECHR was adopted in 1950 and stemmed from the UDHR as a
response to the atrocities of World War II and the Holocaust. 149 Although
the United States is not a party to the ECHR, a number of countries with
sophisticated SIGNIT capabilities are parties-including France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and Russia-which makes the Convention worth
analyzing to understand what obligations, if any, it may impose upon states
to respect foreigners' privacy rights in intelligence collection. 150 Article 8
of the ECHR states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.151
Similar to Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR, Article
145. U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (Apr. 2, 1992).

146.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

147.

See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 515-17 (2008) (asserting that non-self-executing

treaties do not provide rules that bind courts).
148. U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 53d Sess., 1405th mtg.,

7, U.N. Doe.

CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Mar. 31, 1995).

149.

BERNADETTE RAINEY, ELIZABETH WICKS

&

CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (6th ed. 2014), http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts (last visited
May 29, 2017).
150. See Chart ofSignatures and Ratificationsof Treaty 005: Conventionfor the Protectionof
Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (May 29, 2017), https://www.coe.

int/en/web/conventions/full-list-/conventions/treaty/OO5/signatures?p auth=2n4FVkTm (listing the
countries that have signed and ratified the ECHR).
151. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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8 of the ECHR is a vague grant of the right to privacy. The European Court
of Human Rights has provided case law on this topic, though.
In Weber v. Germany, Uruguayan residents alleged that Germany's G 10
Act, which authorized the Federal Intelligence Service, or
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), to conduct "strategic monitoring"
surveillance activities, violated Article 8 of the ECHR. 152 The European
Court of Human Rights first analyzed whether the authorizations to monitor
telecommunications constituted an interference into one's private life and
correspondence. The Court determined the G1O Act indeed constituted
interference regardless of whether the individuals that brought the suit were
actually subject to surveillance. 153 Next, the Court analyzed whether the
interference was authorized by law, whether the law was accessible to the
public, and whether an individual could foresee how the law applied to
him.154 In this case, the interference was authorized by the G 10 Act, which
was made public and was therefore accessible.' 55 Further, the Court
clarified that the law's "foreseeability in the special context of secret
measures of surveillance, such as the interception of communication;
cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the
authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt
his conduct accordingly," but that the law must still give "an adequate
indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which
public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures." 156 The
Court declared that in order to meet the foreseeability requirement, a state
must make public the minimum safeguards of:
the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception
order; a definition of the categories of people liable to have their
telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the
procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data
obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data
to other parties; and the circumstances157in which recordings may or
must be erased or the tapes destroyed.
Germany successfully met these safeguards in this case.1 58 Third, the
Court turned to whether the interference served a legitimate aim. The G 10
Act was intended to protect national security and prevent crime, which the
Court found to be legitimate goals. 159 Fourth, the Court questioned the
152. Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, 2006-X1 Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 4, 63.
153. Id. paras. 76-79.
154. Id. para. 84.

155. Id.paras. 88, 92.
156. Id. para. 93.

157. ld.para. 95.
158. Id.paras. 96-101.
159. Id.para. 104.
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necessity of the interference, focusing on whether the interference was
proportionate in balancing the state's public safety interests and
individual's interest in not being monitored. 160 The Court gave deference to
Germany's national security interests in this analysis and found that
Germany provided adequate safeguards against abuse to satisfy the
proportionality requirement. 161 Therefore,
Germany's "strategic
monitoring" under the G 10 Act did not violate Article 8 of the ECHR, but
Article 8 still imposed obligations upon Germany in relation to foreigners
162
outside of the country.
In Liberty v. United Kingdom, civil liberties groups based in the United
Kingdom and Ireland alleged that the United Kingdom's Interception of
Communications Act of 1985, which was actually repealed prior to the case
by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000, violated Article 8
of the ECHR. 163 The 1985 Interception of Communications Act authorized
British surveillance activities and resulted in the large-scale collection of a
significant portion of the communications between Ireland and the United
Kingdom.' 64 The European Court of Human Rights determined that the
1985 Act constituted interference and that the surveillance was authorized
by the Act. 165 However, the Court determined that the 1985 Act failed the
accessibility and foreseeability criteria because the law did not "set out in a
form accessible to the public any indication of the procedure to be followed
for selecting for examination, sharing, storing and destroying intercepted
material."'166 The United Kingdom therefore violated Article 8 of the ECHR
in Liberty.167 This demonstrates that the European Court of Human Rights
will enforce Article 8 of the ECHR when analyzing surveillance programs
instituted for national security and public safety purposes.
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence on Article 8
of the ECHR indicates that this human rights treaty does impose legal
obligations upon countries even in relation to espionage that targets
foreigners abroad. This is in stark contrast to the UDHR, which does not
impose legal obligations upon countries, and the U.S. interpretation of the
ICCPR in which the United States takes the position that the Covenant does
not apply extraterritorially and is a non self-executing treaty, meaning it
cannot provide a cause of action in U.S. courts. Although the ECHR does
impose obligations on states, which in turn creates privacy protections for
foreigners, the United States is not a party to the ECHR so the ECHR does
not grant privacy protections to any individuals in relation to activities
160.
161.

Id.paras. 106-08.
Id. paras. 108-38.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. paras. 137-38.
Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00,2008 Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 1,5-11 (2008).
Id.para. 57.
Id.paras. 56-60.
Id.para. 69.

167.

Id.para. 70.
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conducted by the United States.
D. InternationalLaw and Espionage
International law likely allows espionage either by failing to regulate spying
or by affirmatively permitting spying.168 The Permanent Court of International
Justice set forth the principle in Lotus, which involved a collision between
French and Turkish ships that a state may act as it desires as long as the state
does not contravene affirmative international law.169 The Court proclaimed:
The rules of law binding upon States... emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as
expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with
upon the
a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions
17
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. 1
The Lotus principle remains an important tenet of international law and
is applicable to espionage because there is no international law that
171
prohibits states from spying on one another and each other's citizens.
Thus, spying is not regulated by international law and states are free to
engage in espionage under the Lotus principle. In addition, espionage has
been practiced throughout history so customary international law would not
have developed to prohibit spying as the practice continuously occurred,
and "non-intervention and sovereignty developed against the background
thus establishing a
understanding that states do and will spy on each other,
172
concepts."'
very
those
within
carve-out for espionage
International law may go beyond not regulating spying and actually
affirmatively permit espionage. Spying is critical for protecting a state's
7 3
national security and enabling a state to act upon its right to self-defense.1
No state would allow an integral part of its ability to defend itself to be
prohibited. Further, states have long practiced espionage and have openly
discussed espionage's presence, which indicates that states recognize the
right to conduct espionage. 174 In addition, states have intelligence sharing
168.

See Ashley Decks, An InternationalLegal Frameworkfor Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT'L

L. 291, 301-02 (2015) (arguing that international law has traditionally been viewed as either not
regulating espionage or affirmatively permitting it).
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 10, 19-20 (Sept. 7).
Id. at 18.
Decks, supra note 168, at 301-02 (asserting that the Lotus principle remains in place today).
Id.at 302.
See, e.g., LOCH JOHNSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 4-34 (2012) (detailing the

critical role that intelligence plays in enabling governments to protect their citizens from threats).
174. See Ashley Decks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International
Law, 102 VA. L. REv. 599, 609-10 (2016) (detailing several instances of government leaders openly

talking about the importance of intelligence).
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agreements with each other, but these agreements would not be valid if the
activity at the heart of the agreement was prohibited under international
law, which indicates the activity is actually permitted.' 75
Therefore, international law does not impose restrictions on espionage
by failing to regulate spying under the Lotus principle or by affirmatively
permitting spying. This means that international law does not require a state
to provide privacy protections for foreigners that are outside of that state.
E. InternationalLaw Does Not Provide a Basisfor PPD-28's
Expansion of Privacy Protectionsto Non-U.S. Persons
This examination of the fundamental grants of human rights indicates
that there is no basis in international human rights principles or international
law for universal privacy rights that constrain legitimate U.S. foreign
intelligence efforts targeting non-U.S. persons outside of the United States.
The UDHR does not create any legal rights or impose any legal obligations
on the United States. The United States has consistently interpreted the
ICCPR to not apply extraterritorially so the Covenant does not extend any
privacy rights or impose any obligations upon the United States in relation
to non-U.S. persons outside of the United States. Although the ECHR treaty
does impose legal obligations upon countries even in relation to espionage
that targets foreigners abroad, the United States is not a party to the ECHR
so it does not grant privacy protections to any individuals in relation to
activities conducted by the U.S. government. Finally, international law does
not restrict espionage. Instead, international law is best interpreted to either
allow espionage to occur under the Lotus principle because international
law does not prohibit spying or to actually affirmatively permit espionage.
The lack of international legal basis for extending privacy protections to
non-U.S. persons outside of the United States indicates that PPD-28's
unprecedented grant of privacy protections to foreigners was purely a
foreign policy decision, not based on a re-evaluation of the U.S. legal
obligations, and therefore can be reversed if it is determined that the
Directive is not in the U.S. interest.
V. How OTHER WESTERN NATIONS APPROACH FOREIGNERS' PRIVACY
RIGHTS WHEN CONDUCTING SIGINT
While the United States traditionally did not provide privacy protections to
non-U.S. persons outside of the United States before PPD-28, it is worth
examining whether other Western nations have provided privacy protections
175. See Decks, supra note 168, at 303 (arguing that "[tihe fact that certain states have entered
into arrangements with other states to limit such spying is additional evidence that international law
either permits or does not prohibit spying").
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to foreigners and whether Western nations have followed in U.S. footsteps to
provide privacy protections to foreigners since the United States issued PPD28. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are useful Western states to
analyze because these countries are strong allies of the United States that share
the U.S. democratic values and have highly capable intelligence services.
Ultimately, no Western nation-or any nation in the world with sophisticated
intelligence capabilities besides the United States for that matter-has issued
robust privacy protections for foreigners before or since PPD-28. France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom have actually passed robust, less privacy
protective, statutes since PPD-28 was issued as the threat environment has
become more complex and dangerous in recent years.
A. France
France was one of the last Western nations to enact a legal framework
to govern its intelligence services. 176 Surveillance in France lacked
statutory authorization and operated based on case law and the
government's general national security authorities until 1991 when a law
"on the secrecy of correspondence emitted via electronic communications"
was passed. 177 This law was subsequently amended several times, including
in 2004,178 2006,179 2012,180 and 2015.181 The French Code of Internal
176. Nicolas Boring, ForeignIntelligence GatheringLaws: France,Library of Congress (June
2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/intelligence-activities/france.php; Dossier de Presse [Press
Release], Premier Ministre [Office of the Prime Minister], Projet de loi Renseignement: Protdger les
Frangais Dans le Respect des Libertrs [Intelligence Bill: Protecting the French People and
Respecting Freedoms] 7 (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/document/
document/2015/03/dp-loi-renseignement v3-bat.pdf.
177. See Ronald Sievert, The ForeignIntelligence SurveillanceAct of 1978 Comparedwith the
Law of Electronic Surveillance in Europe, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 125, 145 (2016) (finding that the
French surveillance regime was largely only governed by past case law and flexible procedures prior
to 1991 when the European Court of Human Rights determined France's surveillance practices
violated Article 8 of the ECI-1R, which spurred the need to enact legislation on the matter);
CHRISTOPHER

WOLF, A TRANSNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVE ON SECTION

702 OF THE FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 10 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/20140319-TestimonyWolf.pdf ("The 1991 law was enacted because the European Court of Human Rights required that
invasions of privacy be provided for in a specific law.").
178. Loi 2004-669 du 9 juillet 2004 relative aux communications dlectroniques et aux services de
communication audiovisuelle [Law 2004-669 of July 9, 2004 on Electronic Communications and
Audiovisual Communication Services], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL
GAZETrE OF FRANCE], July 10, 2004, p. 124 83 .
179. Loi 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative ;! la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions
diverses relatives Ala srcuritd et aux contr6les frontaliers [Law 2006-64 of Jan. 23, 2006 on the Fight Against
Terrorism and Laying Down Various Provisions Relating to Security and Border Controls], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RPPUBLIQUEFRAN(AISE [.0] [OFFICIAL GAZEqrE OF FRANCE], Jan. 24,2006, p. 1129.

180. Ordonnance 2012-351 du 12 mars 2012 relative A la partie 16gislative du code de la s6curitd
int~rieure [Ordinance 2012-351 of March 12, 2012 on the Legislative Part of the Code of Internal Security],
JOURNAL OFFICEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 23,2012.
181. Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 relative au renseignement [Law 2015-912 of July 24, 2015 on
Intelligence], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANQAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July
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Security states that while "[r]espect for privacy, in all its components,
including the secrecy of correspondence, the protection of personal data and
the inviolability of the home, is guaranteed by law," there are circumstances
under which the government can infringe on privacy rights to serve the
public interest, as defined by law.182 French law enables the government to
conduct surveillance to gather intelligence to: protect national
independence, territorial integrity, and national defense; defend major
foreign policy interests, execute France's European and international
commitments, and prevent any form of foreign interference into France;
defend and promote France's major economic, industrial, and scientific
interests; prevent terrorism; prevent attacks on the republican form of
institutions; prevent actions to maintain or reconstitute banned groups;
prevent collective violence that seriously undermines public peace; prevent
crime and organized crime; and prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. 183 The Prime Minister, or an individual delegated
authority by the Prime Minister, must give authorization for such
surveillance based on written and reasoned requests from the Minister of
Defense, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice, or the Ministers
responsible for the economy, budget, or customs (or individuals assigned
this authority by these officials) after the National Commission for the
Control of Intelligence Technology (Comission nationale de contrfle des
techniques de renseignement (CNCTR)) has issued an opinion on the
request. 184 The CNCTR is composed of nine members-two members of
the National Assembly, two senators, two members of the Council of State,
two magistrates, and an individual with technical expertise in electronic
communications.1 85 The Prime Minister is not legally bound by the
CNCTR's opinions, but the Prime Minister must provide an explanation if
he authorizes surveillance contrary to the CNCTR's decision. 186 Also, in
emergency situations concerning national independence, territorial
integrity, national defense, the prevention of terrorism, or the prevention of
attacks on the republican form of institutions, the CNCTR does not have to
review the request for surveillance authorization, but the CNCTR must still
be informed as soon as possible.18 7 The authorization for these surveillance
operations is valid for four months, but can be renewed under the same
procedures that originally granted the surveillance authority. 188 Only
information related to one of the purposes under which the collection
26, 2015.
182.

I (Fr.).
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

CODE DE LA StCURITt INTtRIEURE [C. SEC. INT.] [CODE OF INTERNAL SECURITY] art. L801-

Id art. L811-3.
Jd. art. L821-1-821-2.
Id. art. 831-1.
Id. arts. 821-3-821-4, 833-1-833-11.
Id art. 821-5.
Id. art. L821-4.
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occurred is allowed to be transcribed from the recordings collected, and the
189
recordings have to be destroyed within thirty days following collection.
The legislation requires that transcripts of the surveillance are destroyed
once they are deemed to no longer be necessary for the purposes under
which the information was collected. 190 Intelligence agencies91may also
obtain metadata from telephone and Internet service providers. 1
In November 2015, France enacted a new surveillance law specifically
about international electronic communications as part of the French Code
of Internal Security. 192 Communications that are sent or received outside of
France can be intercepted to gather intelligence to: protect national
independence, territorial integrity, and national defense; defend major
foreign policy interests, execute France's European and international
commitments, and prevent any form of foreign interference into France;
defend and promote France's major economic, industrial, and scientific
interests; prevent terrorism; prevent attacks on the republican form of
institutions; prevent actions to maintain or reconstitute banned groups;
prevent collective violence that seriously undermines public peace; prevent
crime and organized crime; and prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. 193 The Prime Minister is responsible for designating "the
electronic communications networks on which he authorizes the
interception of communications sent or received abroad."' 194 The Prime
Minister, or an individual delegated authority by the Prime Minister,
authorizes the actual interception of communications upon request by the
Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice, or the
Ministers responsible for the economy, budget, or customs (or individuals
assigned this authority by these officials). 195 The data collected from
international communications sent or received abroad are subject to
retention limits of one year after the date the communications are first used
by French authorities within a limit of four years from the date the
communications were collected and six years after the date of collection for
metadata. 196 The retention period for encrypted information does not begin
until the information is decrypted, but encrypted information may not be
kept for more than eight years from the date of collection regardless of
189.
190.
191.

Id. art. L822-2-822-3.
Id. art. L822-3.
Id. art. L851-1.

192. Loi 2015-1556 du 30 novembre 2015 relative aux mesures de surveillance des
communications 6lectroniques internationals [Law 2015-1556 of November 30, 2015 on Measures
to Monitor International Electronic Communications], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANQAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 1, 2015.
193. CODE DE LA SICURITI INTIRIEURE [C. SEC. INT.] [CODE OF INTERNAL SECURITY] art. L811 -

3, L854-1 (Fr.) (listing the purposes that French authorities can conduct surveillance).
194.
195.
196.

Id. art. L854-2.
Id. arts. L821-2, 852-2.
Id. art. L854-5.
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when, or if, decryption occurs. 19 7 Extended retention periods are allowed
for technical analysis in certain circumstances, for example if the data was
part of a cyber-attack. 198 Information may only be transcribed from
intercepted communications for the purpose the information was originally
collected for and transcripts must be destroyed when they are no longer
necessary for that purpose. 199 The CNCTR must be notified of all decisions
and authorizations to conduct international surveillance and has access to
the information collected and transcripts derived from the collection, but
the CNCTR does not issue opinions as with surveillance that occurs within
20 0
France.
The development of French intelligence law demonstrates that it has
been grounded in legislative authority for a much shorter period of time
than U.S. intelligence authority. French SIGINT authorities do not grant
foreigners similar privacy protections as French citizens. The interception
of international communications are subject to less scrutiny than domestic
intelligence collection and retention periods are longer for international
SIGINT compared with domestic intelligence collection. France still has
legal obligations under the ECHR in relation to espionage that targets
foreigners, which the United States is not subject to, and its retention
periods are still shorter than PPD-28, though. Thus, France does provide
limited privacy protections for foreigners even though it clearly protects its
own citizens' privacy much more and does not have a document like PPD28 that specifically grants foreigners privacy protections that are equivalent
in some respect to its own citizens.
B. Germany
Although Germany's Constitution grants the right to privacy, Germany
has not extended this constitutional provision to foreigners regarding
SIGINT collection and has enacted legislation to enable the BND to
conduct extensive foreign SIGINT. Article 10 of the German Constitution
states that:
(1) The privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications
shall be inviolable.
(2) Restrictions may be ordered only pursuant to a law. If the
restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the
existence or security of the Federation or of a Land, the law may
provide that the person affected shall not be informed of the
restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Jd.
Id. art. L854-6.
Id.art. L854-9.
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review of the case by agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by
the parliament.2 ° '
Section 2 of the BND Act, which was enacted in 1990, authorizes the
BND to conduct foreign intelligence collection that is relevant to
Germany's national security and foreign policy interests. 20 2 Any activities
that interfere with Article 10 of the Constitution are subject to the G 10 Act
and approval by the G10 Commission. Surveillance of individuals is limited
to situations in which there is actual grounds for suspicion that someone has
committed or is planning to commit one of a number of enumerated crimes
in the G10 Act.20 3 The G1O Act permits broader SIGINT collection of
communications between an individual inside of Germany with someone
abroad to prevent an armed attack against Germany, prevent a terrorist
attack against Germany, prevent weapons distribution and unauthorized
foreign trade, combat the illicit drug trade in Europe, reduce counterfeiting,
reduce money laundering, reduce human trafficking in Europe, and defend
against malicious information technology programs. 20 4 The GlO
Commission, which consists of four members (including a chairperson who
must be qualified to hold judicial office), is appointed by the Parliamentary
Control Panel and must approve the collection, except in emergency
situations when collection may begin before obtaining the G1O
Commission's approval.20 5 The Parliamentary Control Panel, which
parliament), is also
consists of nine Bundestag members (members of
20 6
activities.
intelligence
these
overseeing
tasked with
However, the German government has interpreted Article 10 of the
Constitution to not cover foreign communications abroad.20 7 Thus, the
BND's collection of purely foreign communications does not implicate
Article 10 and these SIGINT activities are not subject to the GI0 Act and
do not need approval by the G1O Commission-instead, prior to 2016,
and safeguards on the surveillance of
Germany did not impose any "limits
20 8
communications."
foreign
entirely
201.

Grundgesetz

[GG]

[Basic Law],

art.

10, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-

internet.de/englischgg/englischgg.pdf (Ger.).
202. Gesetz tiber den Bundesnachrichtendienst [BNDG] [Federal Intelligence Service Act],
Dec. 20, 1990, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL 1]at 2954, § 2 (Ger.).
203. Gesetz zur Beschrainkung des Brief-, Post- und Femmeldegeheimnisses [GI0] [Article 10
Act], June 26, 2001, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 1254, § 3 (Ger.).

204.

Id. § 5.

205.

Id. § 15.

206. Gesetz fiber die parlamentarische Kontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher Ttitigkeit des Bundes
[PKGrG] [Act on the Parliamentary Control of the Intelligence Activities of the Federation], July 29,
2009, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 2346 (Ger.).
207.

Stefan Heumann, German Exceptionalism? The Debate About the German Foreign

Intelligence Service (BND), in PRIVACY AND POWER: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW
OF THE NSA-AFFAIR 349, 367 (Russell A. Miller ed. 2017).
208. Id.
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In 2016, Germany enacted the Act on the Foreign-Foreign Signals
Intelligence Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service to amend the
BND Act to bring SIGINT collection of content that occurs within Germany
targeting foreigners abroad under explicit legislative authority. 20 9 The 2016
Act authorizes the BND to collect and process SIGINT of foreigners abroad
for national security and foreign policy purposes, which are defined as:
recognizing threats to Germany's internal and external security; preserving
Germany's ability to act; and obtaining findings relevant to foreign and
security policy as determined by the Federal Chancellery, Federal Foreign
Office, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Ministry of Defense,
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, and Federal Ministry
for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2 10 The BND's authorization
for collection that targets E.U. institutions, public authorities of E.U.
Member States, and E.U. citizens is slightly narrower. The 2016 Act
authorizes SIGINT collection targeting E.U. institutions, public authorities
of E.U. Member States, and E.U. citizens regarding an armed attack against
Germany, international terrorism, the proliferation of military weapons, the
illegal drug trade, counterfeiting, international money laundering, human
trafficking, and malicious information technology programs as well as for
national security and foreign policy purposes as defined supra insofar as
they specifically relate to the security of Germany. 2 11 The Act also permits
SIGINT activities targeting E.U. citizens when necessary to identify certain
2 12
criminal offenses.
The BND is allowed to acquire the raw communications data of
foreigners abroad without restriction under the Act of Foreign-Foreign
Signals Intelligence Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service, and then
must use search terms to collect intelligence from this pool of data. 2 13
Collection can only occur after the Federal Chancellery has issued an order
to authorize the collection of data from specific telecommunications
209. Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Femmeldeaufklirung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [Act
on the Foreign-Foreign Signals Intelligence Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service], Dec. 23,

2016, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. 1] at 3346 (Ger.); Jenny Gesley, Germany: Powers of
Federal Intelligence Service Expanded, LIBRARY OF CONG. (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.loc.

gov/law/foreign-news/artice/germany-powers-of-federal-intelligence-service-expanded/.
210. Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufldiirung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [Act
on the Foreign-Foreign Signals Intelligence Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service], Dec. 23,

2016, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 3346, art. 1 § 6, para. I (Ger.).
211. Id. art. I § 6, para 3, art. I § 7; Gesetz zur Beschrinkung des Brief-, Post- und
Fernmeldegeheimnisses [GIO] [Article 10 Act], June 26, 2001, BGBL. I at 1254, § 5, para I (Ger.).

212. Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Femmeldeaufklitrung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [Act
on the Foreign-Foreign Signals Intelligence Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service], Dec. 23,
2016, BGBL. I at 3346, art. I § 6, para. 3, art. I § 7 (Ger.); Gesetz zur Beschr'inkung des Brief-, Postund Fernmeldegeheimnisses [G1O] [Article 10 Act], June 26, 2001, BGBL. I at 1254, § 3, para I

(Ger.).
213. Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Femmeldeaufklhiung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [Act
on the Foreign-Foreign Signals Intelligence Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service], Dec. 23,
2016, BGBL. I at 3346, art. I § 9, para 2.
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214
networks upon application by the head of the BND, or a representative.
The order must specify the search terms that will be used to target E.U.
institutions and public authorities of E.U. Member States, but the order does
not need to specify the search terms that will be used to target E.U. citizens
or other foreigners. 2 15 The order authorizes collection for up to nine months,
but may be extended.216 An "Independent Panel," which consists of two
judges and a federal prosecutor, must examine the order before it takes
effect to determine the "admissibility and necessity" of the order, and the
"Independent Panel" may repeal an order. 217 An order can be executed prior
218
to notification of the "Independent Panel" in certain circumstances.
Further, the BND is authorized to store content for up to ten years. 219 The
collection of metadata remains unrestricted, but may only be stored for six
months.22 °
Thus, Germany distinguishes between Germans and non-Germans in its
intelligence collection authorities, and provides much greater privacy
protections to Germans than non-Germans. This is similar to the approach
that the United States has taken under its social contract theory, of
governance. Notably, although Germany was highly critical of the United
States in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures, the BND has also
engaged in extensive foreign intelligence collection efforts. 22 1 Germany has
214. Id. art. 1 § 6, para. 1, art. 1 § 9, para. 1.
215. Id. art. 1 § 9, para. 2.
216. Id. art. 1 § 9, para. 3.
217. Id. art. 1 § 9, para. 4-5, art. 1 § 16.
218.

Id.

219. Gesetz ber den Bundesnachrichtendienst [BNDG] [Federal Intelligence Service Act],
Dec. 20, 1990, BGBL I at 2954, § 20, para I (Ger.); see also Gesetz tiber die Zusammenarbeit des
Bundes und der Linder in Angelegenheiten des Verfassungsschutzes und iber das Bundesamt fir
Verfassungsschutz, Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz [BVerfSchG] [Act on the Federal Office for the
Protection of the Constitution] [Federal Constitutional Protection Act], Dec. 12, 1990,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL 1] at 2954, § 12 (Ger.).
220. Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Femmeldeaufklhrung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [Act
on the Foreign-Foreign Signals Intelligence Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service], Dec. 23,
2016, BGBL. I at 3346, art. 1 § 6, para. 6 (Ger.); THORSTEN WETZLING, GERMANY'S INTELLIGENCE
REFORM: MORE SURVEILLANCE,

MODEST RESTRAINTS AND INEFFICIENT CONTROLS

12 (2017),

https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/snv-thorsten wetzling-germanys-foreign-intelligen
ce reform.pdf.
221. See, e.g., Maik Baumgdrtner, Martin Knobbe & Jrg Schindler, Documents Indicate
Germany Spied on Foreign Journalists, DER SPIEGEL (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.spiegel.de/

international/germany/german-intelligence-spied-on-foreign-journalists-for-years-a- 1136188.html
(revealing the BND spied on news agencies and journalists around the world, including from the
British Broadcasting Corporation, Der Spiegel, New York Times, and Reuters); Alison Smale,
Germany, Too, Is Accused of Spying on Friends, N.Y. TIMES (May 5,

2015),

https://

www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/world/europe/scandal-over-spying-shakes-german-government.htm
l?_r-l (reporting on allegations that the BND monitored European companies and citizens);
Germany Spied on Friendsand Vatican, DER SPIEGEL (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/interna

(detailing
tional/germany/german-bnd-intelligence-spied-on-friends-and-vatican-a- 1061588.html
the BND's intelligence gathering efforts targeting allied countries, including the United States, and
non-governmental organizations).
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now brought foreign intelligence collection efforts that occur inside of
Germany under positive statutory legal authority, but the acquisition of
SIGINT targeting foreigners abroad that occurs outside of Germany
remains unrestricted. 22 Germany has not extended privacy protections to
foreigners as a matter of law or policy in the manner that PPD-28 does.
C. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom lacked a legal framework for its surveillance
activities for an extended period.22 3 The United Kingdom's initial
legislative efforts focused on surveillance were the Interception of
Communications Act of 1985,224 Police Act of 1997,225 Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA),2 2 6 and Data Retention and

Investigatory Powers Act of 2014 (DRIPA) 227 and the United Kingdom
recently passed the Investigatory Powers Act of 2016.228 The Investigatory
Powers Act largely consolidated previous surveillance authorities, yet did
expand some of the authorities and brought existing intelligence activities
under explicit legislative authority.
The Investigatory Powers Act authorizes targeted interception of
communications, which includes content, related to a particular person,
group of persons, organization, or particular premises upon the issuance of
a warrant. 22 9 A head of an intelligence or law enforcement service may
apply for a warrant. 230 The Act then institutes a "double lock" system in
which the Secretary of State must authorize the issuance of warrant and
then a Judicial Commissioner must approve the issuance. 231 The Secretary
of State can issue a warrant when the Secretary believes that the warrant is
necessary and that the conduct authorized is proportionate to the desired
achievement of the conduct.232 A warrant must be necessary on the grounds
that it is "in the interests of national security," "for the purpose of

222. WETZLING, supranote 220, at 4.
223. See Jon Moran & Clive Walker, Intelligence Powers and Accountability in the UK., in
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY INTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 289, 294
(Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds. 2016) ("[B]efore the last decade or so, the

surveillance powers of the state had rarely been enshrined in law. Accountability was, if anything,
even less developed.").

224.

Interception of Communications Act 1985, c. 56 (U.K.).

225.

Police Act 1997, c. 50 (U.K.).

226.

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23 (U.K.).

227.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, c. 27 (U.K.).

228.

Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25 (U.K.).

229.
230.
231.

Id. § 17.
Id § 18.
Id. §§ 19, 23; U.K. Home Office, Investigatory Powers Act, GOV'T OF THE U.K. (Mar. 1,

2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/investigatory-powers-bill (describing the system
to authorize and oversee interception warrants as a "double lock" system) [hereinafter U.K. Home
Office, Investigatory Powers Act].
232. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 19 (U.K.).
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preventing or detecting serious crime," or "in the interests of the economic
well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant
to the interests of national security" and the information being sought
2 33
relates to acts or intentions of individuals outside of the British Islands.
A Judicial Commissioner, which is an official appointed by the Prime
Minister that holds (or has held) high judicial office, then reviews the
Secretary of State's decision to issue the warrant to determine whether the
warrant is necessary for the approved purposes and whether the conduct
authorized is proportionate to the desired achievement of the conduct. 234 A
Judicial Commissioner's review of the Secretary of State's decision is
determine whether it was lawful, not whether the decision was
intended to
"correct., 235 This likely means that a Judicial Commissioner will grant
deference to the Secretary of State's decision, rather than consider the
merits independently. If a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve the
issuance of the warrant, the Secretary of State may ask the Investigatory
Powers Commissioner, who is also an official appointed by the Prime
Minister and holds (or has held) high judicial office, to decide whether to
approve the Secretary's decision to issue the warrant. 236 Warrants last six
months, but can be renewed by the Secretary of State upon approval from
a Judicial Commissioner. 237 Targeted interception warrants may be served
on any person that is able to provide assistance that is deemed reasonably
practicable to the government in effecting the interception of
communications. 2 38 Material obtained under the targeted interception
warrant must be destroyed once retention is "not necessary, or not likely to
become necessary," in the interests of national security, for the purpose of
preventing or detecting serious crime, or in the United Kingdom, economic
interests that are relevant to national security. 23 9 These broad categories
233.
234.

Id. § 20.
Id. § 23; see id. § 227 (describing how the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is

appointed and the Commissioner's qualifications).
235. Id. § 23. The U.K. Home Office describes judicial review as typically not "substitut[ing]
what it thinks is the 'correct' decision, it will only decide if the decision made was lawful." See
HOME OFFICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDANCE (PART 1) 5 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/

uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/454770/JRGuidance England and Wales 3 0.pdf
[hereinafter HOME OFFICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDANCE (PART 1)].

236. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, §§ 23,227 (U.K.) (describing how the Investigatory
Powers Commissioner is appointed and the Commissioner's qualifications).
237. Id. §§ 32-33.
238. Id. §§ 41, 43.
239. Id. §§ 53(5)-(6). Information may also be retained if:
it is necessary for facilitating the carrying out of any functions under this Act of

the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the person to whom the warrant
is or was addressed, . .. it is necessary for facilitating the carrying out of any
functions of the Judicial Commissioners or the Investigatory Powers Tribunal
under or in relation to this Act, ... it is necessary to ensure that a person ("P")
who is conducting a criminal prosecution has the information P needs to
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may allow the United Kingdom to retain intelligence collected under the
targeted interception warrant authority for a significant period of time.
Also, the Act authorizes bulk acquisition warrants. 240 Bulk acquisition
warrants require telecommunications operators that provide service in the
United Kingdom to turn over specific communications data, which does not
include content,24 ' in the operator's possession or to obtain and turn over
specified communications data that is not in the operator's possession but
that the operator can obtain. 242 Bulk acquisition warrants can relate to data
that currently exists or is not yet in existence at the time the warrant is
issued.243 The head of an intelligence service must apply for the issuance of
a bulk acquisition warrant.244 A bulk acquisition warrant is then subject to
the same "double lock" system, same duration period, and largely the same
retention period as a targeted interception warrant. 245 Similar to the targeted
interception warrant, a bulk acquisition warrant may be served on any
person that is able to provide assistance that is deemed reasonably
determine what is required of P by P's duty to secure the fairness of the
prosecution, .. . or it is necessary for the performance of any duty imposed on
any person by the Public Records Act 1958 or the Public Records Act (Northern
Ireland) 1923.
Id. §§ 53(3), 53(6).
240. Id. §§ 158-175.
241. Id. § 261; U.K. HOME OFFICE, BULK ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIONS DATA: DRAFT
CODE OF PRACTICE 6 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/593750/IP Act - DraftBCD code of practice Feb2017__FINAL WEB.pdf [hereinafter
U.K. HOME OFFICE, BULK ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIONs DATA: DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE]

('communications data' includes 'who,' 'when,' 'where,' and 'how' of a communication but not
the content").
242. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 158(6) (U.K.); U.K. HOME OFFICE, BULK
ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIONs DATA: DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 241, 4.

243. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 158(8) (U.K.).
244. Id. § 158(9).
245. Id. §§ 158-159, 162-63, 171. Material obtained under the targeted interception warrant
must be destroyed once retention is "not necessary, or not likely to become necessary," in the
interests of national security, for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or inthe U.K.
economic interests that are relevant to national security. Information may also be retained if:
it is necessary for facilitating the carrying out of any functions under this Act of
the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the head of the intelligence service
to whom the warrant is or was addressed, . . . it is necessary for facilitating the
carrying out of any functions of the Judicial Commissioners or the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal under or in relation to this Act, ... it is necessary to ensure that
a person ("P") who is conducting a criminal prosecution has the information P
needs to determine what is required of P by P's duty to secure the fairness of the
prosecution, .. . it is necessary for use as evidence in legal proceedings, or... it
is necessary for the performance of any duty imposed on any person by the Public
Records Act 1958 or the Public Records Act (Northern Ireland) 1923.
id. § 171.
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246 A bulk
practicable to the government in effecting the bulk acquisition.
acquisition warrant does have the additional requirement that it must
specify the operational purposes for which the communications data will be
collected.2 4 7 The Secretary of State must provide the list of the operational
purposes to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament every
three months from the time the warrant is issued and the Prime Minister
year.2 48
must review the list of the operational purposes at least once a
Further, the Investigatory Powers Act specifically authorizes bulk
interception warrants to intercept overseas-related communications, which
is defined as communications sent or received by individuals outside of the
British Islands and includes content. 249 A head of an intelligence service
must make an application for this warrant. 250 A bulk interception warrant is
subject to the same "double lock" system and duration period as a targeted
interception warrant. 25 1 A warrant must be necessary on the grounds that it
is "in the interests of national security," "for the purpose of preventing or
detecting serious crime," or "in the interests of the economic well-being of
the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests
of national security." 25 2 The bulk interception warrants have an additional
privacy protection for individuals inside of the British Islands. In order to
examine the content of the communications of an individual known to be
inside of the British Islands that has been collected under this authority, the
government must obtain a targeted examination warrant. 253 The head of an
intelligence agency must make an application for a targeted examination
warrant and then this warrant is subject to the same "double lock" system
as the targeted interception warrant.2 5 4 A targeted examination warrant is
not needed to examine the content of communications sent by or intended

246. Id. §§ 168-170.
247. Id. § 161.
248. Id.
249. Id.§136.
250. Id. §138. See U.K. HOME OFFICE, INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS: DRAFT CODE OF
PRACTICE 43-44 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/593748/IP Act - DraftInterceptioncode of practice Feb2017 FINAL WEB.pdf
(detailing the contents of the application) [hereinafter U.K. HOME OFFICE, INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS: DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE].
251. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, §§ 138-140, 144; see id § 227 (describing how the
Investigatory Powers Commissioner is appointed and the Commissioner's qualifications); U.K.
Home Office, Investigatory Powers Act, supra note 231 (describing the system to authorize and
oversee interception warrants as a "double lock" system); see also U.K. HOME OFFICE, INTERCEPTION
OF COMMUNICATIONS: DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 250, at 47. The U.K. Home Office
describes judicial review as typically not "substitut[ing] what it thinks is the 'correct' decision, it
will only decide if the decision made was lawful." HOME OFFICE, JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDANCE (PART
1), supra note 235, at 5.
252. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 138.
253. Id..§ 152.
254. Id.; U.K. HOME OFFICE, INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS: DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE,
supra note 250, at 26, 61-62.
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for an individual outside of the British Islands.255 Material collected from
bulk interception warrants under the Investigatory Powers Act must be
destroyed as soon as retention is "not necessary, or not likely to become
necessary," in the interests of national security, for the purpose of
preventing or detecting serious crime, or in the United Kingdom, economic
interests that are relevant to national security. 25 6 As with the other warrants,
these broad categories may allow the United Kingdom to retain intelligence
collected under the bulk interception warrant authority for a significant
period of time.
The United Kingdom has robust SIG1NT collection authorities and has
less privacy protections than the United States or other Western nations.
The United Kingdom is authorized to conduct bulk SIGINT collection of
communications content when targeting overseas communications, but is
mainly authorized to conduct targeted collection of communications
content inside the United Kingdom or obtain the bulk acquisition of
communications data, which does not include content, from
telecommunications operators in the United Kingdom. Bulk collection of
communications content will naturally lead to greater collection than
targeted collection of communications content, which means the scale of
privacy interference is greater with bulk collection. Thus, foreigners outside
of the United Kingdom are inherently provided less privacy protections
under the bulk interference warrant authority even though the "double lock"
authorization system, duration period of the warrants, and retention
authority mirrors the targeted collection regime, which is mainly used for
collecting communications inside the United Kingdom. Individuals in the
British Islands also have an additional protection under the bulk
interference warrant authority that individuals outside of the British Islands
do not have because the government must obtain a targeted examination
warrant to examine the content of the communications of an individual
255. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 152; U.K. HOME OFFICE, INTERCEPTION OF
COMMUNICATIONS: DRAFT CODE OF PRACTICE, supranote 250, at 26, 61-62.
256. Investigatory Powers Act 2016, c. 25, §§ 150(5)-(6). Information may also be retained if:

it is necessary for facilitating the carrying out of any functions under this Act of

the Secretary of State, the Scottish Ministers or the head of the intelligence service
to whom the warrant is or was addressed, ... it is necessary for facilitating the
carrying out of any functions of the Judicial Commissioners or the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal under or in relation to this Act, .... it is necessary to ensure that
a person ("P") who is conducting a criminal prosecution has the information P
needs to determine what is required of P by P's duty to secure the fairness of the
prosecution .... or it is necessary for the performance of any duty imposed on
any person by the Public Records Act 1958 or the Public Records Act (Northern
Ireland) 1923.
Id. §§ 150(3), 150(6).
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known to be inside of the British Islands that has been collected under this
authority. A targeted examination warrant is not needed to examine the
content of communications sent by or intended for an individual outside of
the British Islands that has been collected under the bulk interception
warrant authority, though. Further, the bulk acquisition warrants only
enable the bulk collection of communications data, which does not include
content, whereas the bulk interference warrants do enable the collection of
communications content. The collection of content is inherently more
privacy invasive than the collection of non-content communications data.
In addition, the bulk acquisition warrants have greater oversight by
implicating Parliament and the Prime Minister in the process, which creates
additional protections against abuse. Finally, the United Kingdom has not
extended foreigners any additional privacy protections in the aftermath of
PPD-28.
D. EuropeanMotives in CriticizingUS. SIGINT Activities
European governments, especially Germany, were harshly critical of the
25 7
U.S. SIGINT activities following Snowden's unauthorized disclosures.
Certainly, there is a deep commitment to privacy and an embrace of privacy
as a fundamental right in a much more comprehensive manner in Europe,
25 8
and especially in German civil society, than exists in the United States.
However, this examination of the laws governing French, German, and
British SIGINT collection demonstrates that these countries have .the
authority to, and indeed engage in, extensive foreign intelligence collection.
The commitment to privacy as a fundamental right and the concerns
expressed in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures seem to be largely
rhetorical as they are not actually reflected in law or procedures. France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom have not enacted laws that provide
robust privacy protections for foreigners and have not instituted restrictive
policies like PPD-28.
Much of the backlash from European governments against the United
States likely stemmed from domestic political pressures because the publics
in these nations often favor more privacy protections than their
257. See, e.g., Josh Levs & Catherine E. Shoichet, Europe Furious, 'Shocked' by Report of
U.S. Spying, CNN (July 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/30/world/europe/eu-nsa/ (detailing

several public statements from European officials criticizing the United States for its intelligence
collections activities).
258. See, e.g., ADAM SEGAL, THE HACKED WORLD ORDER: How NATIONS FIGHT, TRADE,
MANEUVER, AND MANIPULATE INTHE DIGITAL AGE 158 (2017) ("The divide between Europe and the

United States on privacy is real .

.

. The idea of privacy as a human right is a basic European

principle."); Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and
Recommendationsfor U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, 2 LAWFARE REs. PAPER SERIES, July
2014, at 1, 9-10 (acknowledging Germany's painful history with surveillance and asserting that "[i]n

modem Germany, data privacy has become virtually sacrosanct").
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governments afford, as the governments understand the importance of
intelligence in defending against a complicated threat environment. Further,
to some degree the backlash may also stem from a desire to protect domestic
companies from competition by U.S. technology firms. U.S. technology
companies have dominated the global market, and some European business
leaders and politicians appear to have taken advantage of the Snowden
disclosures and public outcry to promote domestic businesses and enable
domestic technology companies to garner greater market share to the
detriment of U.S. companies by portraying U.S. companies as
untrustworthy because of their (lawful and compelled) cooperation with the
NSA. 259 For example, shortly after the initial Snowden disclosures in
summer 2013, the German Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, stated
that "whoever fears their communication is being intercepted in any way
should use services that don't go through American servers, 260 and
France's Minister for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Innovation and
the Digital Economy, Fleur Pellerin, declared that it was necessary to
"locate datacenters and servers in [French] national territory in order to
better ensure data security., 26 1 In addition, the German government ended
a contract that it had with Verizon in June 2014 and announced it would
end all business with Verizon by 2015, largely as a result of Verizon having
been implicated in the NSA's SIGINT collection activities.262 A German
telecommunications company, Deutsche Telekom, then received the
contract that had been terminated with Verizon by the German
government.263 Several European countries, including France and
Germany, have considered data localization rules that would "limit the
storage, movement, and/or processing of data to specific geographies and
jurisdictions, or [would] limit the companies that can manage data based
upon the company's nation of incorporation or principal sites of operations
and management., 264 Thus, much of the outrage in foreign capitals over the
259. See Kristin Stoller, The World's Largest Tech Companies 2017: Apple and Samsung Lead,
Facebook Rises, FORBES (May 24, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristinstoller/2017/

05/ 24 /the-worlds-largest-tech-companies-2017-apple-and-samsung-lead-facebook-rises/#e3425ead
140d (showing that U.S. technology companies have become the largest companies in the world, and
detailing the prominence of U.S. technology products and services).
260.
(July 3,

German Minister: Drop Google ifYou Fear U.S. Spying, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
2013), https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2013/07/03/german-minister-

drop-google-if-you-fear-us-spying.
261. Valdry Marchive, France Hopes to Turn PRISM Worries into Cloud Opportunities,
ZDNET (June 21, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/france-hopes-to-tum-prism-worries-intocloud-opportunities/.
262. SEGAL, supra note 258, at 162; Aaron Mamiit, German Government Drops Verizon
Contract in Fear of US. Espionage, TECH TMES, (June 27, 2014), http://www.techtimes.com/

articles/9292/20140 6 2 7/german-govemment-drops-verizon-contract-in-fear-of-u-s-espionage.htm.
263.

SEGAL, supra note 258, at 162; Mamiit, supra note 262.

264.

See Hill, supra note 258, at 3 (analyzing the recent data localization movement and the

motivations behind this trend, and discussing German Chancellor Merkel's suggestion that "Europe

should build out its own Internet infrastructure, permitting Germany to keep its data within Europe");
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unauthorized disclosures of the U.S. SIGINT activities may actually be
driven by those countries' national economic interests, rather than a
rejection of the U.S. long-standing position that foreigners are not entitled
to the same privacy protections as a country's own citizens.
VI. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COSTS FROM PPD-28's EXPANSION OF
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS TO NON-U.S. PERSONS

While serving as the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism, Lisa Monaco dismissed the claim that PPD-28
imposed additional security risk on the United States. She asserted that
PPD-28 was "not costly for our national security" because there were in
added risks assumed by adhering to the Directive's
practice no 265
requirements.
Intelligence collection is fundamentally different than law enforcement
surveillance. As Robert Litt, then-General Counsel of the ODNI, has
explained,
In a typical law enforcement context a crime has been or is about to
be committed and the goal is to gather evidence about that particular
crime. Intelligence on the other hand is often an effort to find out
what is going to happen so that we can prevent it from happening, or
simply to keep policy makers informed. This means we cannot limit
our signals intelligence activities only to targeted collection against
specific individuals who we've already identified. We have to try to,
uncover threats or adversaries of which we may as yet be unaware,
such as hackers seeking to penetrate our systems, or potential
terrorists, or people supplying nuclear materials to proliferators. Or
we may simply be seeking information to support the nation's
266
political leadership in the service of other foreign policy interests.

Myriam Gufflet, French Senate Proposes DataLocaliztion, 1NT'L ASS'N OF PRIVACY PROF'LS (May
12, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/french-senate-proposes-data-localization/ (discussing a proposal
that was made in the French Senate in May 2016 to "require personal data to be stored in the
European Union and prohibit the transfer of personal data to a non-[E.U.] third country"); Miller,
supra note 81 (reporting that Germany, among other countries, has "consider[ed] legislation that
would make it costly or even technically impossible for American tech companies to operate inside
their borders"); Plans to Stop US. Spying with European Interest, FRANCE24 (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.france24.com/en/20140217-european-intemet-plans-nsa-spying (revealing that France
and Germany have discussed creating a European communications network to enable Europeans to
send and receive emails and other data without having the information pass through U.S. networks
and servers).
265. Monaco, supra note 73.
266. Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence
Community Surveillance One Year After President Obama's Address, Remarks at the Brookings
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The principal security costs from PPD-28 are the restriction on the
Intelligence Community's ability to use bulk SIGINT to collect political
intelligence regarding the plans and intentions of foreign governments and
the retention limit. The Intelligence Community's routine collection of
political intelligence is critical to ensuring that U.S. policymakers are
informed and can make the best decisions regarding U.S. foreign policy
actions. The limitation on the Intelligence Community's ability to collect
political intelligence will result in the decreased effectiveness in obtaining
critical information about foreign governments that could help U.S.
policymakers in crafting their decisions. Ultimately, policymakers may
have a less complete understanding of a situation when making foreign
policy decisions because of PPD-28's restriction on the use of bulk
SIGINT.
Under PPD-28, the retention period for non-U.S. person information
was shortened to five years unless comparable U.S. person information
could be stored for longer or the DNI makes a national security
determination that the data should be kept for a longer period. 26 7 Although
the retention periods for information collected under Section 702 were
already limited prior to PPD-28, non-U.S. person information collected
under SIGINT activities conducted under EO 12333 were not subject to
such retention limits. Unevaluated content and metadata collected under
Section 702's PRISM (now called downstream), in which the government
compels an electronic communications service provider to turn over the
communications that are sent to or from a specific selector (such as an email
address), or telephony data collected under Section 702 was already subject
to a retention limit of five years prior to PPD-28.2 68 Unevaluated data
Institute

(Feb.

4,

2015),

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/20150204_

intelligence surveillance litt transcript.pdf.
267.

PPD-28, supra note 1, § 4.

268.

NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, CIVIL LIBERTIES

&

PRIVACY OFFICE,

NSA's

IMPLEMENTATION OF

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT SECTION 702 (2014), at 8, https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/0421/702%20Unclassified%20Document.pdf [hereinafter NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, CIVIL
LIBERTIES & PRIVACY OFFICE, NSA's IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT SECTION 702]; NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, As

AMENDED § 3(c)(1 ) (2011), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization%2OProcedures%20
used%2oby%20NSA%2oin%2oConnection%20with%20FISA%2oSECT/o20702.pdf [hereinafter
NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN
CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION

702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, As AMENDED]; see PRIVACY & CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 7 (2014), https://www.nsagov/
about/civil-liberties/resources/assets/files/pclobsection_702_report.pdf
[hereinafter PRIVACY &
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT] (giving an explanation of PRISM);
see also NSA Stops Certain Section 702 'Upstream'Activities,NAT'L SECURITY AGENCY (Apr. 28,
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collection under Section 702's upstream collection, in which the
government compels companies that operate "the telecommunications
'backbone' over which telephone and Internet communications transit" to
turn over communications that are sent to or from (and formerly "about") a
specific selector, was-and still is-subject to a two year retention limit
prior to PPD-28. 269 While PPD-28 does not limit Section 702's retention
periods, the Directive still constrains SIGINT collected under EO 12333.
EO 12333 authorizes the NSA to collect SIGINT abroad on non-U.S.
persons and the vast majority of SIGINT is actually collected under EO
12333.270 Thus, PPD-28's retention limit is a significant, novel, and fully
voluntary constraint.
Deleting information after five years prevents the Intelligence
Community from being able to analyze previous records from beyond this
period, which could lead to security harms. This constraint inherently limits
investigative leads that the Intelligence Community could pursue.
Sometimes it is necessary to look at data and information that was collected
a number of years in the past to find out critical information about people
that can aid in gaining intelligence in the present. This is especially true in
the counterterrorism context when preventing attacks is largely about
detecting relationships between people. It is especially beneficial to have
an extensive library of information that links people together to be able to
fully understand the personal relationships that exist.
For example, an extremist plotter may be identified by the Intelligence
2017), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/statements/2017-04-28-702-statement.shtml
(stating that PRISM is now referred to as downstream).
269. NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, CIVIL LIBERTIES & PRIVACY OFFICE, NSA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT SECTION 702, supra note 268, at 8; NAT'L SEC. AGENCY,
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH
ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, As AMENDED, supranote 268, § 3(c)(2); See PRIVACY &
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, supra note 268, at 7 (giving an
explanation of upstream). Upstream collection formerly included the acquisition of "about"
communications in which the selector of a target was contained in the communication, but the NSA
ended "about" collection in April 2017 because of trouble complying with FISC regulations. Charlie
Savage, N.S.A. Halts Collection ofAmericans' Emails About Foreign Targets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/us/politics/nsa-surveillance-terrforism-privacy.html?
NSA
article;
action=Click&contentCollection=BreakingNews&contentlD=65223440&pgtype
Stops Certain Foreign Intelligence Collection Activities Under Section 702, NAT'L SECURITY
AGENCY (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/press-releases/2017/nsastops-certain-702-activites.shtml; NSA Stops Certain Section 702 'Upstream 'Activities, supra note
265.
270. ContinuedOversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: HearingBefore the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing on ContinuedOversight of the
ForeignIntelligence SurveillanceAct] (statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Director, National
Security Agency); NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, LEGAL FACT SHEET: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 1 (2013),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1 306769/legal-fact-sheet-executive-order- 12333.pdf
[hereinafter NAT'L SEC. AGENCY, LEGAL FACT SHEET: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333].
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Community on Day X. Intelligence officials would then conduct database
searches to learn everything they could about the extremist based on all the
information the Intelligence Community had. This may include the
individual's family history, education and training, confederates, religious
views, and country of origin among other information. However, under
PPD-28's retention limits, it may turn out that the Intelligence Community
does not have any records on the extremist currently in its possession
because the data on these matters was more than five years old so they were
deleted to respect the recently identified extremist's privacy interests. To
make matters worse, the Intelligence Community would not even know that
the records had been previously deleted because there would not be an
index of deleted records. Thus, in this scenario the Intelligence Community
would lose the opportunity to discover who the newly identified extremist's
past confederates were because of PPD-28's restrictions. While the
relationship between the identified extremist and that individual's
confederates could have continued throughout the previous five years, the
communications may have only been taking place over a domain that U.S.
intelligence does not know about or have access to, and the only electronic
intelligence that exists on his personal associations was older than five years
and therefore deleted because it did not have specific known national
security significance under PPD-28 at the time. Ultimately, the Intelligence
Community would be left with a dangerous situation in which it does not
even know what it does not know. 27 1 This same troubling scenario of events
would leave U.S. intelligence with a deficit of knowledge when it discovers
a new terrorist or malicious group because U.S. intelligence would have
been deleting information about the group's members before it realized
these individuals were malign actors, which would diminish U.S. ability to
properly map the network.
Five years is not a long time for a retention period. In 2015, Professor
Carrie Cordero, a former lawyer at DOJ's NSD and the ODNI, warned "this
provision risks the possibility that information collected in 2010 that has
not yet been analyzed but might concern activities of terrorist networks in,
say, Iraq, might now be nearing age-off duration. For leadership responsible
for counterterrorism, I would think that would be a hard policy to submit
2 72
to."

PPD-28's dissemination rule, which limits the dissemination of non271.

See Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def., DoD News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002),

http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptlD=2636
("[Tlhere are known
knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say
we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones
we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free
countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.").
272.

Carrie Cordero, First Take on Government's Surveillance Reform Update Report,

LAWEARE (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/first-take-governments-surveillance-refor
m-update-report.
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U.S. persons' personal information to the dissemination reasons allowed
for U.S. persons, also adds security costs. This new dissemination limit
creates additional administrative, processing, and oversight burdens
because an official analyzing an intelligence report will now have to request
the actual names of the non-U.S. persons that are masked when necessary
to understand the intelligence in the report. This will slow down the
intelligence process and distract from more important intelligence work.
The additional minimization processes that must be put into place also cost
money in addition to the extra time and effort expended.
Perhaps most pervasive, PPD-28 signals an enormous shift in U.S.
intelligence culture. Prior to this Directive, there was no law or policy in
the United States that recognized foreigners' privacy interests in
intelligence collection. Foreigners abroad were not part of the U.S. social
contract and were therefore not granted the same privacy rights as U.S.
persons. However, after PPD-28 the Intelligence Community must
consciously respect foreigners' privacy rights, and develop and implement
regulations to protect foreigners' privacy rights. PPD-28 has instituted a
legal and policy regime that voluntarily constraints the U.S. Intelligence
Community at a time when the United States faces an exceptionally
2 73
complex threat environment and cannot afford to become risk averse.
The Directive risks creating a culture of diminished aggressiveness, and
could potentially lead to a legal culture that interprets rules in an overly
restrictive manner reminiscent of the "wall" prior to the September 11
terrorist attacks, which was a significant hindrance that contributed to
missing opportunities to possibly anticipate the attacks.274
PPD-28's grant of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons does not
appear to have arisen from a re-examination of the legal limits on the U.S.
government's authority to conduct SIGINT. The Fourth Amendment's
protections do not extend to foreigners abroad, the UDHR does not create
any legal rights or impose any legal obligations on the United States, the
United States has consistently interpreted the ICCPR to not apply
273.

General Michael Hayden, former Director of the CIA and NSA, in commenting on PPD-

28 posed the rhetorical questions: "What additional administrative burdens can we afford to place
on a system that is already stressed keeping up with the demand of a very turbulent world? And what
unneeded caution would such a legal and policy regime impose on a bureaucracy that we cannot
afford to be risk averse?". MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, PLAYING TO THE EDGE: AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN
THE AGE OF TERROR 412-16 (2016). See generally Mike Pompeo & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Crippling
the Intelligence We Used to Get bin Laden, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/crippling-the-intelligence-we-used-to-get-bin-ladencrippling-the-intelligence-we-used-to-g
et-bin-laden-1392077089; David R. Shedd, How Obama UnilaterallyChilled Surveillance, WALL

ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-obama-unilaterally-chilled-surveillance1448833262?tesla=y.
274.

See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11

COmMISSION REPORT 78-80 (explaining the "wall" and its tragic consequences); see also Manpearl
& Chaudhry, supranote 27, at 74 (discussing the emergence of the "wall," its negative consequences,
and the efforts to remove the "wall").
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extraterritorially so the ICCPR does not extend any privacy rights or impose
any legal obligations on the United States in relation to non-U.S. persons
abroad, and international law does not appear to restrict espionage. This
supports the conclusion that PPD-28 was purely a foreign policy decision
intended to calm the controversy that stemmed from the Snowden
disclosures, appease important allies (especially Germany), and limit harms
to the U.S. private sector. 2 75 As a policy decision, PPD-28 can be rescinded
if it is not in the U.S. interest to keep the Directive. Thus, the important
question becomes whether the risks imposed by PPD-28 are acceptable in
view of current foreign policy and commercial considerations.
VII. THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF PPD-28's EXPANSION OF
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS TO NON-U.S. PERSONS
The foreign policy impact of the Snowden disclosures has substantially
subsided and foreign governments, such as Germany, have been less critical
of U.S. intelligence activities as reports of their own unregulated
intelligence collection have become public. There is still an important
commercial interest to consider when analyzing whether the United States
should keep or rescind PPD-28.
European law provides privacy protections to data subjects, and the Data
Protection Directive provides that data transfers to countries outside of the
European Union is only permissible if the non-E.U. Member Country
provides an "adequate level of protection.'276 As a non-E.U. Member State,
the United States must therefore be judged to have adequate levels of data
protection to be able to have personal data transferred from European
countries to the United States. This is extremely important for U.S.
technology companies that also operate in Europe because they need to be
able to pass data freely from Europe to the United States. The European
Union and United States formerly had the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor
Framework to satisfy the E.U. data protection requirements and to facilitate
this data transfer. Under the Safe Harbor agreement, which went into effect
in 2000, U.S. companies self-certified that they were in compliance with
the data protection laws of the E.U. countries in which they did business by
277
signing up under the agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce.
275. This assessment aligns with Lisa Monaco's, then-Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, assessment of the internal debate that led to PPD-28 that it was a
decision "as a matter of policy, they were not legal requirements." Monaco, supra note 73.
276.

Directive 95/46, art. 25(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 45 (E.C.). A new Data Protection

Regulation entered into force in May 2016 and will apply beginning in May 2018 to replace the Data
Protection Directive. The new regulation also covers privacy protection and data transfers to third
countries. Regulation 2016/679, art. 45(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (E.C.).
277. Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, EXPORT.GOV (last visited
http://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg main_01 8475.asp.
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was responsible for taking
companies that were found to not
enforcement action against participating
2 78
be in compliance with the agreement.
However, the ECJ invalidated the European Commission's decision that
concluded the U.S. "Safe Harbor Privacy Principles" provided adequate
data privacy protections to Europeans in Schrems in 2015 .279 Following the
Snowden disclosures, Max Schrems, a privacy activist, challenged the Safe
Harbor framework, alleging that the United States did not offer adequate
280
data protections based on the NSA's intelligence collection programs.
The ECJ found that "legislation permitting the public authorities to have
access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications"
violated the right to privacy under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union and that "legislation not providing for any possibility for
an individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal
data relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data"
violates the right to effective judicial protection under the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 2 81 Critically, the ECJ
determined that the European Commission's decision did not comply with
the Data Protection Directive because the decision did not fully analyze
U.S. domestic law privacy protections-the European Commission's
decision only examined the U.S. Department of Commerce's "Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles," which was limited in its description of the statutory and
regulatory privacy protections that exist in the United States. 28 2 The Data
Protection Directive required a more robust examination of the U.S. privacy
protections to determine the adequacy of those protections. 2 3 Ultimately,
this led the ECJ to invalidate the European Commission's determination.
The ECJ's ruling meant that the Safe Harbor agreement could no longer be
relied upon by companies as a way of ensuring that they were in compliance
with E.U. data protection requirements.
The Schrems ruling created a great deal of economic concern for U.S.
technology firms. The ruling impacted nearly 4,500 companies, which had
relied on the Safe Harbor agreement to transfer data between the European
Union and United States. 284 This added to the already difficult environment
278.

Safe Harbor Enforcement Overview, EXPORT.GOV

(last visited May 30, 2017),

https://build.export.gov/main/safeharbor/eu/eg main_018481.
279. Schrems, supra note 4, 106.
280. Id. IT 26-36.
281. Id.TT 94-95.
282. Commission Decision 2000/520 of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the

European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe
harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (E.C.).
283. Schrems, supra note 4, 96-98.
284. Ellen Nakashima, Top E.U. Court Strikes Down Major Data-SharingPactBetween U.S.
and Europe, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
2
eu-court-strikes-down-safe-harbor-data-transfer-deal-over-privacy-concerns/ 015/10/06/2da2d9f6-
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for U.S. technology companies, which were harmed by the Snowden
disclosures because of foreign consumers' concerns about U.S.
surveillance. Foreign consumers were skeptical to use American products
or online services because they feared that their communications would
become accessible to U.S. law enforcement or intelligence agencies. 285 U.S.
technology companies lost between $35 and $180 billion in revenue over
286
the three-year period following the Snowden disclosures.
Thus, developing a new data sharing agreement between the United
States and European Union was extremely important. The United States and
European Union negotiated the E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework to
replace Safe Harbor, and the European Commission determined that the
framework was adequate to allow data transfers to the United States under
E.U. law in July 2016.287 PPD-28 played a critical role in the negotiation of
Privacy Shield. PPD-28 was discussed in multiple letters from U.S. officials
that accompany the Privacy Shield's text and the European Commission's
determination that the United States ensures an adequate level of privacy
protection to enable the agreement to go into effect explicitly discussed
PPD-28. 288 The Department of Commerce assesses that the Privacy Shield
will facilitate more than $260 billion annually in digital services trade
between Europe and the United States. 289 As of April 2017, nearly 2,000
6c2a-1 le5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_story.html?utm term=.15bf5dc75e72.
285. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 81 (discussing the increased skepticism by foreign consumers
of U.S. technology products and services following the Snowden disclosures).
286. DANIEL CASTRO, How MUCH WILL PRISM COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY?
3 (2013) (calculating that U.S. technology companies would lose up to $35 billion between 20132016 following Snowden's unauthorized disclosures about the NSA's intelligence programs); James
Staten, The Cost of PRISM Will Be Larger Than ITIF Projects, FORRESTER (Aug. 14, 2013), http://
blogs.forrester.com/james staten/13-08-14-the cost of prism will be larger than itif projects
(estimating that U.S. technology companies could lose up to $180 billion between 2013-2016
because of disclosures about NSA programs).
287. Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided
by the E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1 (E.U.).
288. fd.; Letter from John F. Kerry, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Vra Jourov, Comm'r, European
Comm'n Annex A (July 7, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/annexes euusprivacy shield en.pdf (describing U.S. privacy protections, including PPD-28, and describing
the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson position created to handle inquiries regarding U.S. SIGINT
practices from individuals in the European Union); Letter from Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office
of the Dir. Nat'l Intelligence, to Justin S. Antonipillai, Counselor, U.S. Dep't of Commerce & Ted
Dean, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Int'l Trade Admin. (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.privacyshield.
gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015tOOOOOOO4qlF (summarizing the information regarding
U.S. SIGINT collection activities that was provided to the European Commission to aid the
Commission in its assessment of U.S. privacy protections, which ultimately resulted in the
Commission determining that the United States has adequate privacy protections); Letter from
Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. Nat'l Intelligence, to Justin S. Antonipillai,
Counselor, U.S. Dep't of Commerce & Ted Dean, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Int'l Trade Admin.
(June 21, 2016), https://www.privacyshield.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015t0000000
4q IA (providing further information regarding bulk SIGINT collection).
289. Pritzker, supra note 2.
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companies were participating in Privacy Shield.2 9 ° In addition to the
economic significance of Privacy Shield, and the role PPD-28 played in
facilitating its negotiation, PPD-28 has also played an important role in
restoring trust in U.S. products and services.
Rescinding PPD-28's surveillance limitations may have an economic
impact if European consumers become alarmed about the privacy trade-offs
of using American digital goods and services or if E.U. regulators question
the assurances that undergird the Privacy Shield agreement. In 2014,
Internet-related companies in the United States generated $966.2 billion in
revenue, which accounted for 6% of the U.S. Real Gross Domestic
Product. 29 1 Economic strength allows countries to have political and
military power, and to have strong geopolitical influence. 2 92 Therefore, it is
important to consider the commercial interests of U.S. businesses when
considering whether PPD-28 should be maintained or rescinded.

VIII. How TO PROCEED?
The United States must consider the security costs that are imposed by
PPD-28's voluntary constraints on the U.S. Intelligence Community and
the economic interests that could be harmed by rescinding PPD-28 in
determining how to proceed. The United States could choose to become a
global leader in championing the expansion of universal privacy rights,
maintain the status quo by keeping PPD-28 in its current form, revise PPD28 to make the expansion of privacy protections to another country's
citizens contingent upon that country extending reciprocal privacy
protections to U.S. persons, or rescind provisions in PPD-28 that expand
privacy protections to non-U.S. persons abroad.
A. Become a Global Leader in Championingthe Expansion of Universal
Privacy Rights
The United States could embrace a more global view of governance, in
which the government is responsible to all humans worldwide-not just its
own citizens. This view partially stems from the idea that technological
advancements have made the world much more interconnected, and that
290. See David J. Bender, Covington & Burlington LLP, Privacy Shield Approaches 2,000
Participants; Review Scheduled for September, NAT'L L. REv. (Apr. 9, 2017),

http://www.natlawreview.com/article/privacy-shield-approaches-2000-partiipants-review-schedul
ed-september (reporting that nearly 2,000 companies have signed up as self-certified under the
Privacy Shield Framework as of April 2017).
291. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INTERNET Ass'N, MEASURING THE U.S. INTERNET SECTOR 5 (2015).
292. See Eric Manpearl, Preventing "GoingDark":A Sober Analysis andReasonable Solution
to Preserve Security in the Encryption Debate, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65, 83 (2017)
(discussing the importance of economic strength in facilitating overall geopolitical strength).
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national borders are less significant. Under this approach, the United States
would champion the idea that all humans deserve robust privacy protections
regardless of nationality. 293 Thus, PPD-28 would just be the first step in
attempting to establish a global norm that foreigners outside a state's
borders are entitled to the same privacy rights as a country's own citizens.
This would likely be done in the hope that U.S. citizens would benefit
from universal privacy rights because other countries could also adopt the
U.S. approach and provide privacy protections to foreigners in their own
intelligence collection efforts. In addition, this approach would in part be
driven by the desire to ensure that U.S. companies have access to foreign
markets and that foreign consumers have trust in U.S. technology products
and services, which would benefit the U.S. economy.
However, such an embrace of global governance and universal privacy
rights would constitute a major break with U.S. social compact tradition.
The approach would also mean that the United States would be accepting
the enormous security costs that would come from such a decision. The
United States could not maintain nearly the same level of intelligence
capabilities as the Intelligence Community currently has if the United States
voluntarily granted foreigners abroad the same privacy protections as U.S.
persons and developed an international norm by encouraging other
countries follow suit. This would inevitably mean that the Intelligence
Community would lose visibility into malicious actors and threats because
the United States-as with all countries-has fewer resources to identify
threats from foreigners abroad compared with its ability to identify threats
from citizens inside the country.2 9 4 Ultimately, pursuing this path would
greatly diminish the U.S. capacity to gain intelligence to protect U.S.
national security interests, the American people, and the Homeland.

293. See David Cole, More on the Rights of Others-Ben Wittes 'Failure of imagination,JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/3128/rights-ben-wittes-failure-imag
ination/ (taking a more global view of governance and advocating for universal privacy rights
regardless of nationality). See generally David Cole, More on Wittes and the Rights of Others, JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/3148/wittes-rights/; David Cole, The New
U.S. "Red Line"-No Privacy Rights For Foreigners, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 21, 2013),
https://www.justsecurity.org/3567/red-line-privacy-rights-foreigners/?print; David Cole, Time to
End the Spying Game, NATION (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/time-end-spyinggame/; David Cole, We Are All Foreigners:NSA Spying and the Rights of Others, JUST SECURITY
(Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/2668/foreigners-nsa-spying-rights/; David Cole, We
Are All Foreign Nationals-Even Orin Kerr, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.just
security.org/281 7/foreign-nationals-orin-kerr/.
294. See Ryan Goodman, Should ForeignNationalsGet the Same PrivacyProtections Under
NSA Surveillance-or Less (or More)?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.just
security.org/ 6797/foreign-national s-privacy-protections-nsa-survei lance-or-or-more/ (citing this
as a potential reason to offer less privacy protections to foreigners abroad); see also Peter Margulies,
Sweeping Claims and CasualLegal Analysis in the Latest U.N. Mass SurveillanceReport, LAWFARE
(Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/sweeping-claims-and-casual-legal-analysis-latestun-mass-surveillance-report.
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B. Maintain the Status Quo by Keeping PPD-28 in its CurrentForm
In weighing the security costs against the foreign policy and economic
benefits of PPD-28, the United States could come to the conclusion that
PPD-28 should be maintained in its current form. The United States
certainly faced backlash from foreign governments after the Snowden
disclosures that threatened important partnerships and risked other
countries imposing constraints on intelligence sharing with the United
States, which would have negatively impacted U.S. national security.
Partner countries faced domestic political pressure from populations that
were angered by the NSA's global intelligence activities, which created the
possibility that these countries would be more limited in their ability to
cooperate with the United States and compelled foreign leaders to seek
concessions from the United States as a result of the scandal. Also, this
approach would likely be pursued in part in hoping that other countries
would provide similar privacy protections to U.S. citizens as the United
States extended in PPD-28.
Further, foreign consumers became skeptical of U.S. technology
products and services, which impacted U.S. -companies' revenues in the
aftermath of the disclosures. The disclosures also led to the Schrems case
in which the ECJ invalidated the European Commission's decision that
concluded the U.S. "Safe Harbor Privacy Principles" provided adequate
data privacy protections to Europeans, meaning the Safe Harbor data
sharing agreement could no longer be relied upon by U.S. companies. as a
way of ensuring they were in compliance with E.U. data protection
requirements. This raised tremendous concerns for U.S. businesses. PPD28 played a significant role in securing the successful negotiation of the
new Privacy Shield Framework, which replaced the Safe Harbor
agreement. Privacy Shield and regaining trust in U.S. technology products
and services are very important to U.S. economic interests and may warrant
keeping PPD-28 in place because economic strength enables the United
States to exert geopolitical influence.
However, the foreign policy considerations that animated issuance of
PPD-28 seem to be significantly diminished. A great deal of the public
backlash against the United States over the disclosures has subsided with
time and because it has been disclosed that other countries' intelligence
services engage in similar activities as the NSA. In addition, there has been
a greater recognition of the complex and dangerous threat environment
since the initial disclosures. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS) conquered large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq and
proclaimed the creation of a caliphate in June 2014-a year after
Snowden's initial disclosures. 295 While Europe was sharply critical of U.S.
295.

WILLIAM MCCANTS, THE ISIS APOCALYPSE 121-22 (2015); MICHAEL MORELL, TE
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intelligence efforts, between June 2014 and June 2017 ISIS directly carried
out or inspired significant attacks in Europe in Belgium,2 9 6 France,2 9 7
Germany, 298 Turkey, 2 99 and the United Kingdom. 30 0 This has led to a
greater realization in Europe of the severity of the current threat landscape.
PPD-28 may have aided in appeasing partner governments in the immediate
aftermath of the disclosures when the Directive was issued in January 2014,
but the foreign policy concerns that led to PPD-28 seem to be much less
pronounced in 2018. Still, the economic considerations of not wanting to
possibly upend Privacy Shield and eroding foreign consumers' trust in U.S.
technology products and services could outweigh the security costs
30 1
presented by PPD-28's voluntary constraints.

GREAT WAR OF OuR TIE 305-09 (2015).

296. See Natalia Drozdiak et al., ISIS Claims Responsibilityfor Brussels Attacks; More Than
30 Dead,WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/people-injured-after-explosionat-brussels-airport-police-say-145863 2527 (reporting on the Brussels terrorist attacks).
297. See Rukmini Callimachi, ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling ParisAttacks 'Firstof the
Storm', N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2Ol5/11/15/world/europe/isisclaims-responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miraces.html?rreft=collection%2Fnewseventc
ollection%2Fattacks-in-paris (discussing the Paris terrorist attacks and ISIS's involvement in the
attacks); Adam Nossiter et al., Three Teams of CoordinatedAttackers CarriedOut Assault on Paris,
Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com20l5/
11/1 5/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html?rref-collection%2Fnewseventcollection%2Fattack
s-in-paris (analyzing ISIS's involvement in the Paris terrorist attacks and the increased threat of
external attacks from ISIS); Alissa J. Rubin & Aurelien Breeden, ISIS Claims Truck Attacker in
FranceWas Its 'Soldier,' N.Y. TiMES (July 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/world/
europe/isis-nice-france-attack.html?mcubz-0 (describing the terrorist attack in Nice and ISIS's
claim of responsibility); Nice Attack: What We Know About the Bastille Day Killings, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36801671
(recounting the public
information regarding the Nice terrorist attack).
298. See Frederik Pleitgen e al., BerlinAttack: ISIS Claims it InspiredAssault on Market, CNN
(Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/ 12/20/europe/berlin-christmas-market-truck/ (reporting
on the terrorist attack on the Berlin Christmas market).
299. See Faith Karimi et al., ISIS Leadership Involved in Istanbul Attack Planning, Turkish
Source Says, CNN (June 30, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/30/europe/turkey-istanbulataturk-airport-attack/ (analyzing the Istanbul airport terrorist attack and ISIS's role in planning the
attack). Only a small part of Turkey is in Europe and it is a candidate country to be an E.U. Member
State. Turkey, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: WORLD FACTBOOK (May 8, 2017),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.
Turkey is a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member. Id.
300. See Katrin Bennhold et al., TerrorAlert in Britain is Raised to Maximum as ISIS Claims
Manchester Attack, N.Y. TnMEs (May 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/world/
europe/manchester-arena-attack-ariana-grande.html?mcubz-0 (recounting the public information
regarding the Manchester terrorist attack and ISIS's claim of responsibility).
301. See Cameron F. Kerry & Alan Raul, The Economic Case for Preserving PPD-28 and
PrivacyShield, LAWFARE (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/economic-case-preservingppd-28-and-privacy-shield (arguing that PPD-28 should be preserved because of its economic
benefits for the United States.).
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C. Revise PPD-28to Make the Expansion of Privacy Protectionsto
Another Country's Citizens Contingent Upon That Country Extending
Privacy Protectionsto US. Persons
Alternatively, the United States could modify the status quo to make
PPD-28's expansion of privacy rights to another country's citizens
30 2
contingent upon that country extending privacy rights to U.S. persons.
This approach would embrace the viewpoint that PPD-28's economic
importance-and even its diminished foreign policy benefits-are worth
the security costs. The approach would only apply to a select group of allied
countries so the United States would be free to engage in SIGINT collection
on the citizens of more adversarial nations unhindered by PPD-28's
restrictions. 30 3 The goal of modifying the status quo in this manner would
be to create a norm amongst allied governments to respect the privacy rights
of each other's citizens. 30 4 No other country followed the United States in
granting robust privacy protections to foreigners abroad-that are
equivalent to the protections provided to a country's own citizens in some
respect-after the United States issued PPD-28. This means that 'U.S.
citizens have not received the same grant of privacy protections from 6ther
countries as the United States has extended to those other countries'
citizens. Perhaps making PPD-28's grant of privacy protections to other
countries' citizens contingent upon the other country taking reciprocal
action would incentivize other countries to extend privacy protections to
U.S. persons. 30 5 Thus, U.S. citizens would be granted the same privacy
protections by allied governments that the United States granted to those
countries' citizens in PPD-28.
D. Rescind PPD-28's Privacy Protectionsfor Non-U S. Persons
Finally, the United States could determine that PPD-28 poses
unacceptable security costs that outweigh its potential economic or foreign
policy importance and decide to rescind PPD-28's expanded privacy
protections to non-U.S. persons abroad. This approach would be based on
the premise that the United States cannot afford to unilaterally disarm its
intelligence capabilities, which are critical to protecting U.S. national
security interests, the American people, and the U.S. Homeland. The U.S.
Intelligence Community has fewer resources to identify malicious actors
and threats in foreign countries compared with the U.S. government's

302.

See ADAM KLEIN ET AL., SURVEILLANCE POLICY: A PRAGMATIC AGENDA FOR 2017 AND

BEYOND 50-56 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report-Surveill

ance-Final.pdf (advocating for this approach).
303.

Id.

304. Id.
305.

Jd. at 53-56.
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ability to identify threats from U.S. citizens inside the nation's own borders.
This means that SIGINT collection is especially necessary to collect
intelligence on foreigners abroad, and the United States would be harmed
by imposing restrictions on itself in this area.
The restriction on using bulk SIGINT to collect political intelligence
diminishes the Intelligence Community's ability to pursue one of its
principal missions of providing policymakers with information regarding
the plans and intentions of foreign governments to aid policymakers in
crafting U.S. foreign policy decisions. This will leave policymakers with a
less complete understanding of a situation when making decisions.
Although PPD-28 did not limit retention periods for information collected
under Section 702, PPD-28 did limit retention for SIGINT collected under
EO 12333, which constitutes the vast majority of SIGINT collected.3 °6 The
restrictive retention periods limit investigative leads that the Intelligence
Community is able to pursue, which is especially harmful in the
counterterrorism context in which preventing attacks is largely about
detecting relationships between people, sometimes historical ones. Also,
PPD-28's dissemination restrictions create administrative, processing, and
oversight burdens that slow down the intelligence process and distract from
more important intelligence work that is actually critical to national
security. Further, PPD-28 signals an unhealthy paradigm shift in U.S.
intelligence culture. The U.S. government and Intelligence Community had
never previously recognized that foreigners abroad had privacy rights that
should be protected under U.S. law or policy. Foreigners abroad are not part
of U.S. social compact and were therefore not granted the same privacy
protections as U.S. persons. However, under PPD-28 the Intelligence
Community must protect foreigners' privacy rights. This risks creating a
culture of diminished aggressiveness, which could result in troubling
security harms-especially at a time when the United States faces an
exceptionally complex threat environment.
The foreign policy considerations that initially spurred PPD-28 have
been greatly diminished. The public backlash from foreign publics and
governments has subsided with time. Also, disclosures since PPD-28 was
instituted have shown that other countries' intelligence services engage in
robust intelligence collection and do not extend privacy protections to
foreigners abroad. Further, partner countries, especially in Europe, that
were critical of the NSA's activities following the Snowden revelations
have come to realize the extraordinarily complex and dangerous threat
environment that currently exists, and some have even suffered terrorist
attacks on their own soil. This has led several countries to push for even
306. Hearingon Continued Oversight of the ForeignIntelligenceSurveillance Act, supra note
270, at 4 (statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency); NAT'L
SEC. AGENCY, LEGAL FACT SHEET: ExECuTIVE ORDER 12333, supra note 270, at 1.
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greater intelligence collection and sharing. 30 7 Thus, PPD-28 may have been
an overreaction to the backlash the United States faced in the immediate
aftermath of the unauthorized disclosures.
PPD-28's extension of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons is
connected with important U.S. economic interests, though. However, it is
feasible for the United States to rescind PPD-28 and still maintain Privacy
Shield, or reach a future data sharing agreement with the European Union
that allows U.S. technology companies to continue prospering. The ECJ did
not hold that U.S. privacy protections were inadequate in Schrems, so
rescinding PPD-28 would not inherently mean that U.S. privacy protections
would be found inadequate. In Schrems, the ECJ stated that the adequacy
of a third country's privacy protections must be determined based on a
comparison to the protections provided "in the E.U. legal order." 30 8 The
United States may be found to have adequate privacy protections even after
rescinding PPD-28 if the adequacy determination is truly based on a
comparison to European countries' legal regimes. European countries have
not instituted privacy protective laws or policies like PPD-28, so rescinding
the Directive would not make the U.S. privacy protections less adequate
than the privacy protections offered by European governments. Also,
European countries have actually passed robust, less privacy protective,
statutes since PPD-28 was issued and it has been revealed that European
intelligence services engage in the same type of SIGINT activities as the
NSA. Ultimately, it may become increasingly difficult for European
institutions to find U.S. privacy protections inadequate going forward now
that it has become public that European countries also engage in similar
intelligence collection activities and have even less privacy protective
legislative regimes to govern intelligence collection than the United States.
In addition, although Snowden's disclosures negatively impacted U.S.
307. See Michael Birnbaum, After Paris Attacks, E. U Leaders Call For More Sharing of
Information, Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

2
europe/after-paris-attacks-eu-leaders-call-for-more-sharing-of-information-inteiligence/ 15/01/19
/9a3e6438-9fe6-1 Ie4-903f-9f2faf7cd9fe story.html?utm term=.e8cd953b8986 ("E.U. nations plan
'to share information, intelligence, not only with the European Union but also with other countries
around us,' E.U. foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini said Monday after a meeting on
counterterrorism with E.U. foreign ministers and top diplomats from several Middle Eastern

nations."); Patrick Tucker, 'DramaticImprovement' in U.S. and European Intel Sharing Because of
ISIS, DEFENSE ONE (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/dramatic-

improvement-us-and-european-intel-sharing-because-isis/1051 2 0/ (reporting that there had been a
"pendulum swing" between the Snowden disclosures and early 2015 in the willingness of European
security officials to share information with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies because
of the increased threat from ISIS); European Spy Agency to Boost Intel-Sharing on Potential
Terrorists, FRANCE24 (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.france24.com/en/20160219-europe-counterterrorism-intelligence-sharing ("The November [2015] attacks in Paris by terrorists linked to the
Islamic State (IS) group prompted renewed calls for greater cross-border intelligence cooperation in
Europe, especially after it was revealed that Belgium had information on the perpetrators of the
attacks.").
308. Schrems, supra note 4, 96.
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companies in their immediate aftermath, foreign consumers' skepticism to
use American technology products and online services may have
diminished. Facebook reported that it had 2.2 billion users that logged on
at least once a month in the first quarter of 2017, which is an increase from
the 1.16 billion users that logged on at least once a month in the second
quarter of 2013, when Snowden first disclosed NSA programs.3 0 9 In 2015,
70% of Facebook users logged on daily, which was an increase from the
63% of users that logged on daily in August 2013-just two months after
the initial unauthorized disclosures. 3 10 Also, Google announced in February
2016 that Gmail had over one billion active users.311 This was an increase
from the 900 million active users that Gmail had in 2015, when it became
the most popular email service in the world, and from the 425 million active
users Gmail had in 2012, prior to the Snowden disclosures. 3 12 These
statistics indicate that consumer trust may have rebounded and that
consumers are willing to use U.S. products and services.
Further, a 2016 study that surveyed 1510 participants, including both
information technology security experts and non-experts, from the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, found that privacy and security
only play a minor role in people's decisions to use a particular mobile
instant messenger. 3 13 The primary reason that participants gave for using a
3 14
mobile instant messenger was whether their friends used the messenger.
46.1% of participants from the United States, 48.2% of participants from
the United Kingdom, and 54.9% of participants from Germany stated this
3 15
was the main reason that they used a particular mobile instant messenger.
On the other hand, only a small percentage of participants stated that the
main reason they used a mobile instant messenger was because of privacy
and security.3 16 Only 5.6% of participants from the United States, 3.4% of
participants from the United Kingdom, and 13.1% of participants from
Germany stated that this was the main reason that they used a particular
309. Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 4th Quarter 2017 (in
Millions), STATISTA (2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-

facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
310.

Maeve Duggan, The Demographics of Social Media Users, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 19,

2015), http://www.pewintemet.org/2015/08/19/the-demographics-of-social-media-users/ (analyzing
2015 statistics regarding social media usage); Maeve Duggan et al., Frequencyof Social Media Use,
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/frequency-of-social-mediause-2/ (analyzing 2014 and 2013 statistics regarding social media usage).
311. Frederic Lardinois, Gmail Now Has More Than lB Monthly Active Users, TECHCRUNCH
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/01/gmail-now-has-more-than-1 b-monthly-active-

users!.
312.

Id.
ALEXANDER DE LUCA ET AL., EXPERT AND NON-EXPERT ATTITUDES TOWARDS (SECURE)
INSTANT MESSAGING 147-51 (2016), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups20 !6/

313.

soups2016-paper-de-luca.pdf.
314. Id.
315.

Id.

316.

Id.
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mobile instant messenger. 3 17 Consumers seem to care more about being
able to be connected to friends, having easy to use and reliable products,
and having sleek interfaces and useful applications, and seem willing to
sacrifice some privacy and security in exchange. As long as U.S. companies
U.S.
continue to lead in the areas that consumers care about the most,
3 18
market.
technology
the
dominate
to
continue
companies will likely
Thus, PPD-28 may not be vital to maintaining Privacy Shield or
reaching a future data sharing agreement with the European Union, and the
Directive may not truly be needed to reduce foreign consumers' skepticism
of U.S. technology products and services. One German expert has even
stated that "most Germans are 'totally unaware' of PPD-28.,, 3 19 This means
that while the foreign policy considerations that initially spurred PPD-28
have diminished and the economic impact of rescinding PPD-28 may be
muted, the security costs of keeping PPD-28 may result in grave risks to
U.S. national security. This analysis could lead the United States to
determine it is necessary to rescind PPD-28's expansion of privacy
protections to non-U.S. persons.
IX. THE PATH FORWARD
The United States should rescind PPD-28's unprecedented privacy
protections for non-U.S. persons. The United States cannot afford to
unilaterally disarm its intelligence capabilities, which are critical to
protecting U.S. national security interests, the American people, and the
U.S. Homeland. The preclusion from using bulk SIGINT to collect political
intelligence diminishes the Intelligence Community's ability to pursue one
of its principal missions of providing policymakers with information
regarding the plans and intentions of foreign governments to aid
policymakers in crafting U.S. foreign policy decisions. The restrictive
retention periods limit the Intelligence Community's investigative leads,
and is especially harmful to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. PPD-28's
dissemination restrictions create administrative, processing, and oversight
burdens that slow down the intelligence process and distract from more
important intelligence work that is actually critical to national security.
Also, PPD-28 signals a dangerous shift in U.S. intelligence culture. The
United States had never previously recognized that foreigners abroad had
privacy rights that should be protected under U.S. law or policy. Foreigners

317.

Id.

318. See Manpearl, supra note 292, at 91-92 (making a similar argument that U.S. companies
will not lose market share or economic viability, but in the context that consumer pressure may not
actually be driving the move toward encryption that cannot be decrypted upon applicable legal
process).
319.

KLEIN ET AL., supra note 302, at 53.
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abroad are not part of U.S. social compact and were therefore not granted
the same privacy protections as U.S. persons. However, PPD-28's grant of
privacy protections to non-U.S. persons alters this approach and risks
creating a culture of diminished aggressiveness in the Intelligence
Community, which could result in troubling security harms at a time when
the United States faces an exceptionally complex threat environment.
The foreign policy considerations that initially spurred PPD-28 have
been significantly diminished. The backlash from foreign governments and
foreign publics has subsided with time, disclosures since PPD-28 was
issued have shown that other countries' intelligence services engage in
robust intelligence collection and do not extend privacy protections to
foreigners abroad, and partner countries have come to realize the complex
and dangerous threat environment. Also, the economic impact of rescinding
PPD-28's grant of privacy protections to non-U.S. persons may not be
substantial. It is quite feasible that the United States could rescind PPD-28
and still maintain Privacy Shield, or reach a future data sharing agreement
with the European Union that allows U.S. technology companies to
continue to thrive. 320 Further, foreign consumers' skepticism to use
American technology products and online services may have diminished
since the Snowden disclosures. Foreign consumers may not truly care
about-or even be aware of-the additional protections provided under
PPD-28. Thus, PPD-28's expansion of privacy protections to non-U.S.
persons poses unacceptable security costs that outweigh its potential
economic or foreign policy importance.

320. See STEWART BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN'T STOPPNG TOMORROW'S
TERRORISM 89-152 (2010) (detailing the U.S. negotiations with the European Union to reach the
2007 Passenger Name Recognition (PNR) agreement, in which the United States faced significant
opposition from E.U. officials regarding privacy protections during the discussions on the agreement
to allow passenger information to be sent to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, but was
ultimately able to secure an agreement that protected U.S. national security).
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